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This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or
investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit
for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability
constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where
limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of
the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which
one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to
a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints.
In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be
monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is
not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not
be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.
KEYWORDS: relational contracts · self-enforcement · limited commitment · risk sharing
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C61 · C73 · D86 · D91 · L14
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers a situation where two agents repeatedly engage in joint production. In each period, both
agents simultaneously undertake an action or investment that produces a joint output. Agents must decide how
much to invest each period (there is full depreciation) and how to divide up joint production. We assume there
is a hold-up problem, that is, contracts on action or division decisions are not enforceable and each agent has an
outside option that is increasing in the investment of the other agent.1 Production and the extent of the hold-up
problem may depend on an exogenous state and agents may be risk averse. The only link between periods is a
Markov process determining states. There is complete information: apart from the fact that the agents choose
their actions simultaneously each period, everything is observable. The only friction is that contracts cannot be
enforced. We consider allocations or contracts from which no agent has an incentive to renege by imposing
self-enforcing constraints at each date and state. We refer to feasible contracts that satisfy these constraints as
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Economic and Social Research Council (Research Grant: RES-000-23-0865).
We also thank, in particular, Pierre Dubois, Francisco Gonzalez, Bruno Jullien and John Moore for valuable comments. All errors are
ours.
1 We assume there is weak complementarity in production and make assumption on the properties of the outside options. We also
assume that agents face limited liability constraints. The exact details of the model are given in Section 2.
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dynamic relational contracts. We characterize the Pareto-efficient dynamic relational contracts; we refer to
such contracts as optimal contracts.
A number of results for special or limiting cases of this model are known. First, one-sided-action versions of
this model or variations on it, have been studied by a number of authors (see, e.g., Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
2004, Kovrijnykh 2013, Sigouin 2003, Thomas and Worrall 1994). Typically, this literature has considered the
case where both agents are risk neutral, there is limited liability and the agent taking the action can commit.
To prevent the uncommitted agent from taking his/her outside option, actions may be kept low initially. A
key insight of this literature is that incentives are improved when payments to the uncommitted agent are
backloaded into the future. This provides a growing carrot for adhering to the contract. Consequently, the action
or investment of the other agent can be increased in the future. This generates dynamics in the agent’s actions
as well as in monetary payments. In the long run, actions and transfers converge to a stationary distribution that
maximizes the surplus, output less action costs, given the self-enforcing constraints. The speed of backloading
is restricted by the limited liability constraints. Ray (2002) has established the most general backloading result
of this type. He considers a general, but non-stochastic, principal-agent model in which both parties may take
actions. The principal can commit within each period, so the self-enforcing constraint only applies to the agent.
He shows that an efficient contract has terms that move in favour of the agent, converging in finite time to the
efficient self-enforcing continuation that maximizes the agent’s payoff.2
Second, consider the case where agents have no action to take, or where there is no hold-up problem. In this
case, the model involves sharing a stochastic endowment. The case in which agents have their own stochastic
endowment and can share risk subject to limited commitment constraints has been widely studied (see, e.g.,
Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon et al. 2002, Thomas and Worrall 1988). A result of this pure risk-sharing case
is that a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation evolves toward a stationary distribution, and that, for some
parameter values, the distribution of future expected utilities is non-degenerate.3 Although the distribution is
non-degenerate, the solution exhibits an “amnesia” property that once an agent is constrained, the contract
from then on is independent of the past history of shocks.4
Third, there are a very few papers in this limited commitment literature that examine the situation where two
or more agents take actions. The most relevant paper to ours is Acemoglu et al. (2011) that considers a model of
2 Opp and Zhu (2013) consider the effect of differences in discount rates where the agent can also abscond with some part of the
transfer. This creates a tension between frontloading and backloading incentives that may generate oscillations in the payoffs.
3 For this result the two-sided lack of commitment is crucial because if there is only one-sided lack of commitment, utilities converge
to a degenerate distribution.
4 Agents are constrained if at the optimum they are just indifferent between adhering to the contract and reneging and taking the
outside option.
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changes in political power.5 In Acemoglu et al. (2011) a Markov process determines which risk-averse political
party is in power. Political parties take actions that contribute to a common pool of resources whether in power
or not, but only the party in power gets to determine the allocation of resources across agents. Therefore, states
are identified by the agent in power. It is shown that in a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation, the action
of one of the agents (the one in power) is always chosen efficiently and actions of other agents (those not in
power) are distorted downward. Furthermore, they establish a convergence result that depends on whether a
first-best allocation is sustainable or not: if a first-best allocation is sustainable, then the actions and the division
of resources converges to a degenerate (first-best) distribution; otherwise, allocations do not converge to a
degenerate distribution. The two-agent model with quasi-linear utility considered in their paper corresponds
to a limiting case of our model where in each state one agent has all the property rights.6 Their convergence
result, when a first-best allocation is sustainable, corresponds to our Theorem 3(a). In Theorem 3(b) we impose
stronger conditions on the primitives of the model and assume that the stochastic process is i.i.d., but establish
convergence to a unique limiting distribution that is independent of initial conditions.
Fourth, our model is related to the broader literature on relational contracting (see, e.g., Doornik 2006, Levin
2003, Rayo 2007) that builds on the work of Macleod and Malcomson (1989). This literature has studied
models with more general ingredients (including many-sided actions, enforceable payments, moral hazard,
hidden information, and endogenous property rights), but has restricted attention to stationary equilibria, thus,
eliminating any interesting dynamics in investments and transfers. The restriction to stationary equilibria is
either derived, because stationary contracts are optimal (when agents are risk neutral and in the absence of
limited liability), or imposed, because the focus is on organizational structures under which full efficiency can
be achieved. One exception to the focus on stationary contracts is Fong and Li (2012) who introduce limited
liability and moral hazard into a risk-neutral model firms and workers based on Levin (2003). They show that
if the principal extracts most of the surplus, the backloading of the agent’s utility can lead to a probationary
contract in which the agent’s wage is initially at the lower bound, and incentives are provided by the threat of
termination; at some point this threat is removed and the wage increases to a higher level. This can create more
volatile wages within firms and greater dispersion in wages across firms.7
We impose two simplifying assumptions on our model. First, we assume that agents’ preferences are
quasi-linear in consumption and actions. This simplifies the problem because with quasi-linear preferences
5 Fischer (2013) considers a somewhat related model where two agents make a choice between a safe and a risky investment. One
implication of his model is that more risk tolerant agents may engage in more risk taking and therefore more informal insurance.
6 They also consider more general utility functions and more than two agents.
7 Similarly, Yang (2013) introduces agent heterogeneity as well as unobservable effort into a relational contracting model to consider
wage dynamics within a firm.
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efficient actions (and hence, surplus) are determined independently of the distribution of resources. Second,
we impose sufficient conditions that the constrained Pareto-frontier is concave. This simplifies our problem
because it allows us to focus on non-random contracts.8 We examine two main cases: where agents are
risk neutral but consumption is constrained to be non-negative (limited liability) and where agents are risk
averse. In the case of risk-averse agents we assume that preferences are such that non-negativity constraints on
consumption can be ignored.
If agents are risk neutral, optimal contracts involve two phases. In the first phase there is backloading
with zero consumption for the constrained agent.9 This backloading property extends to utilities and not just
consumption and we establish that the constrained agent overinvests up to the last period of the backloading
phase and the terms of the contract move monotonically in his/her favour. This overinvesment arises because
it allows further transfer of utility to the other agent who consumes the extra output. It occurs despite the
hold-up problem, that in a static model, would lead to underinvestment.10 The second phase is stationary
and independent of the initial conditions. Consumption and investment depend on the state but not on the
time period. Each agent has positive consumption and, for a given state, either both invest efficiently or both
underinvest. In either case, current surplus is maximized subject to the self-enforcing constraints. Convergence
to the stationary phase is monotone in the sense that whenever the same state recurs in the backloading phase,
surplus is higher at the later date.
Results are somewhat different when agents are risk averse and depend on whether or not it is possible to
sustain a first-best allocation for some division of the surplus, as in Acemoglu et al. (2011). If it is possible to
sustain a first-best allocation, then the optimal contract is similar to the risk-neutral case: convergence is again
monotone. Actions tend to first-best actions in the long-run. If the first-best allocation cannot be sustained, then
there might be an initial monotone phase, but in the long-run, when there are two or more states, monotonicity
does not obtain: when the same state recurs, surplus will sometimes be higher at the later date and sometimes
lower. There is also a trade-off between achieving efficient risk-sharing and maximizing current surplus even
in the long run. In particular, and in contrast to the risk-neutral case, current surplus is not maximized. Better
risk-sharing is achieved by holding the action of one agent inefficiently low because this reduces the outside
option of the other agent, that is, it relaxes the latter’s self-enforcing constraint. We show that the optimal
contract depends on the past history of states and does not in general exhibit the amnesia property of the pure
8 It would be straightforward to allow for random contracts by introducing a public randomization device, but at the cost of considerable
complexity of notation and statements of our results. Furthermore, the assumptions we make are consistent with those that are commonly
made in the literature.
9 Consumption may be positive in the last period of this phase. Note that this first phase may not exist and its existence depends on the
initial split of overall surplus, the discount factor and other parameter values.
10 Nevertheless, we demonstrate that it is never the case that both agents overinvest—even at different dates—in any optimal contract.
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risk-sharing model.11 Furthermore, we consider the limit as the hold-up problem vanishes and show how the
optimal contract converges to the pure-risking contract of Kocherlakota (1996).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides some general results that
apply to both the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases. Section 4 analyses the risk-neutral case and Section 5 the
risk-averse case. Section 6 concludes. Statements of Lemmas and the proofs of the main results are found in
the Appendix. Proofs of the Lemmas are relegated to the Supplementary Material.
2. MODEL
We consider a dynamic model of joint production where agents repeatedly undertake an action or investment
that generates a joint output. Once produced agents have the opportunity to unilaterally expropriate some of
the joint output for their own benefit. In this section, we shall describe the economic environment and the set
of dynamic relational contracts. We define a game played by the two agents and identify dynamic relational
contracts with the subgame perfect equilibria of that game. Our interest is in optimal contracts, that correspond
to the set of Pareto-efficient subgame perfect equilibria.12
2.1. Economic environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,2, . . . ,∞. At the start of each period, a state of nature s is realized
from a finite state spaceS with n≥ 1 states. The state evolves according to an irreducible, time homogeneous
Markov chain with transition matrix [pisr], where ∑r∈S pisr = 1, all s ∈S . The chain starts from an initial state
s0 at date t = 0.13 We denote the state at date t by st and the history of states by st = {s0,s1, . . . ,st}.14
There are two agents, i = 1,2. At every date t, and after the state at that date is observed, both agents
simultaneously choose an action/investment ai ∈ R+. Actions produce an output ys(a)≥ 0 that depends on the
state s and the action pair a := (a1,a2) (details are given below in Assumption 2). Having observed actions and
output, the agents agree to split output and each consumes non-negative consumption ci, c := (c1,c2)∈R2+. We
impose that consumption is non-negative as a simple way to reflect a limited liability constraint on the transfers
11 Ábrahám and Lacsó (2013) establish a similar result in a model of risk-sharing model and storage. The absence of the amnesia
property is more consistent with the empirical evidence (see Broer 2013).
12 More precisely, we focus on efficient pure subgame-perfect equilibria relative to specified “Nash reversion” punishments, although
our characterization also applies mutatis mutandis to optimal punishments, should they be different, and hence, to efficient equilibria
among the set of all pure strategy equilibria.
13 For part of our convergence result in the risk-averse case of Section 5, we shall suppose that the process is i.i.d.
14 Where we write st , we shall assume this is a positive probability event unless otherwise stated, because zero probability events play
no role here.
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one agent can make to the other. Consumption c is feasible if c1 + c2 ≤ ys(a). Agent i derives per-period utility
ui from net consumption xi := ci−ai, x := (x1,x2) ∈ R2.15 We make the following assumptions on ui and ys:
ASSUMPTION 1: Per-period utility ui: [¯
xi,∞)→ {−∞}∪R is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and concave function of net consumption, where
¯
xi ≤ 0.
ASSUMPTION 2: For each s ∈S , the production function ys:R2+→R+ is twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. Furthermore, for each s ∈S , ∂ 2ys(a)/∂a1∂a2 ≥ 0
(complementarity); ys(0) = 0 and the upper contour sets {a ∈ R2+ | ys(a)−a1−a2 ≥ γ}, γ ∈ R, are compact.
Assumption 2 imposes fairly standard conditions on the production function. The last part of Assumption 2
is a simple way to restrict actions to a compact set A (s). Denote surplus in state s by zs(a) := ys(a)−a1−a2.
Define the first-best action pair a∗(s) as the actions that maximize surplus in state s. Given Assumption 2, the
first-best action pair exists and is unique.16 We refer to the surplus zs(a∗(s)) as the first-best surplus. Since
actions are chosen simultaneously and independently, we also define the conditionally efficient actions a∗i (a j,s),
i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, such that
a∗i (a j,s) := argmax
ai∈R+
[ys(a1,a2)−ai].
The conditionally efficient actions are single-valued, continuous functions of the other agent’s action (Lemma 1).
Given the complementarity assumption, they are weakly upward sloping . In addition, a∗i (s) = a
∗
i (a
∗
j(s),s) for
i, j = 1,2, i 6= j.
We now specify what an agent can get if there is no agreement on how to divide up output. If no agreement
is reached, agent i gets a breakdown consumption of φ si (a), and hence, a breakdown utility of ui(φ si (a)−ai).
An agent can always take the option of receiving her breakdown utility. More formally, we suppose the agents
play a Nash demand game to divide output.17 In this Nash demand game, both agents simultaneously announce
consumption claims (c˜1, c˜2), c˜i ≥ 0. If c˜1 + c˜2 = ys(a), then this determines the division of output: consumption
ci = c˜i. Otherwise, agents receive their breakdown consumption: ci = φ si (a).
The specific assumptions on φ si (a) are given below, but a simple example with proportional defaults captures
what we have in mind. Suppose that each agent can, by defaulting, capture a fraction θi of the available
output ys(a). Here, φ si (a) = θiys(a). We assume that agents cannot obtain more that the available output, so
15 The linearity in actions could be replaced by a convex cost function hi(ai) such that net consumption xi = ci− hi(ai) without
changing the analysis.
16 We will shortly make assumptions about the payoff when the relationship breaks down (Assumption 3) that will impose additional
restrictions on the production function. These will imply that the first-best action pair is strictly positive.
17 What we want to capture is that there is an ex ante agreement on what actions should be taken, and how the resulting output should
be split, and that failure to abide by it leads to the breakdown utilities. The Nash demand game is a simple way of implementing this
idea – but we stress that our results are not sensitive to the way it is operationalized.
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θ1 +θ2 ≤ 1, but we do not require that the sum exhausts available output. For example, disagreement may
incur a cost, such as lawyers’ fees or bargaining costs, so that some of output is lost when there is default. In
such cases, θ1 +θ2 < 1. We assume θi > 0, so that what an agent gets in the breakdown is increasing in the
action of the other agent. This assumption captures the hold-up feature of joint production we wish to model.
As another example, consider the special case with additive production: ys(a) = f s1(a1)+ f
s
2(a2) and suppose
φ si (a) = θ si1 f
s
1(a1)+θ
s
i2 f
s
2(a2), θ
s
i j ≥ 0 and ∑2i=1 θ si j ≤ 1, j = 1,2.18 Our hold-up assumption requires θ si j > 0,
i, j = 1,2, i 6= j. With this parameterization, assuming∑2i=1 θ si j = 1 and taking the limit as θ si j→ 0, for i, j = 1,2,
i 6= j and for all s ∈S , produces the pure risk sharing model that has been studied by Kocherlakota (1996),
Ligon et al. (2002) and others. This is discussed in Section 5.
Analogous to Assumption 2, we shall assume that φ si (a) satisfies:
ASSUMPTION 3: For each s ∈S and i = 1,2, the function φ si :R2+→ R+ is continuous, twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. Moreover, ∂ 2φ si (a)/∂a1∂a2 ≥ 0
(complementarity) and ∂φ si (0,a j)/∂ai > 1 for all a j ∈ R+, i, j = 1,2, i 6= j. In addition, φ si (0,0) = 0 for
i = 1,2 and
∂φ s1(a)
∂ai
+
∂φ s2(a)
∂ai
≤ ∂y
s(a)
∂ai
∀s and i = 1,2.(1)
In the case of proportional defaults, these conditions (apart from ∂φ si (0,a j)/∂ai > 1) follow directly from
Assumption 2. Complementarity in Assumption 3 implies that the reaction functions in the breakdown game
are weakly upward sloping, and this simplifies the arguments below. Condition (1) requires that the increase
in the total breakdown consumption cannot exceed the marginal product. Together with φ si (0,0) = 0, it
implies that the φ si (a) are feasible, that is, φ s1(a)+φ
s
2(a)≤ ys(a) for each a and s. Condition (1) together with
∂φ si (0,a j)/∂ai > 1, i = 1,2 implies that the first-best action pair is strictly positive. The assumption that φ si
is strictly increasing in both its arguments, in particular that ∂φ si (a)/∂a j > 0 for i 6= j, captures the hold-up
property of the model.
Denote the Nash best-response functions (functions because φ si (a1,a2) is strictly concave in ai) in the
breakdown game by
aNi (a j,s) := argmax
ai∈R+
[φ si (ai,a j)−ai].
The Nash best response function aNi (a j,s) is continuous and weakly increasing in a j. Moreover, we have 0<
aNi (a j,s)< a
∗
i (a j) for each a j and every state s∈S (Lemma 2). It is strictly positive because ∂φ si (0,a j)/∂ai >
18 This is very similar to the formulation used by Halonen (2002).
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1 and is less than the conditionally efficient action because of the hold-up assumption that ∂φ si (a)/∂a j > 0.
The best-response breakdown utility is
uNi (a j,s) := ui(φ
s
i (a
N
i (a j,s),a j)−aNi (a j,s)).
A Nash equilibrium of the breakdown game occurs where the best-response functions intersect (existence
follows by standard arguments). Without further assumptions, the Nash equilibrium need not be unique.19
However, the potential non-uniqueness is not critical because the Nash equilibria can be Pareto-ranked (because
the best-response functions are non-decreasing and all Nash equilibria lie below the first-best action pair a∗(s)).
Henceforth, we let (aNE1 (s),a
NE
2 (s)) denote the dominant Nash equilibrium and all our results apply relative to
this dominant Nash equilibrium.
2.2. Dynamic Relational Contracts
We refer to a non-negative action and consumption sequence {a(st),c(st)}t≥0 as a contract. Corresponding
to a contract, agent i’s lifetime utility is
Vi(s0) := E
[
∑∞t=0 δ tui(ci(st)−ai(st)) | s0
]
,
where δ is a common discount factor, 0 < δ < 1, and E denotes expectation. A contract is feasible if
∑i ci(st)≤ yst (a(st)) for every history st .
A dynamic relational contract (DRC) is a feasible contract from which neither agent has an incentive to
deviate. The incentive to deviate depends on the punishment for deviation. This is given by the breakdown
payoffs in the current period (subsequent to the deviation), and by play of the (dominant) equilibrium of the
static breakdown game in all future periods. In particular, suppose that a is the current recommended action
pair. If agent i is to deviate at t, then the best she can do is to choose aNi (a j(s
t),st), which yields a current
payoff uNi (a j(s
t),st).20 She is punished from t+1 by “Nash reversion” in which both agents choose their best
responses in the breakdown game, that is, both will thereafter play the (dominant) Nash equilibrium of the
breakdown game described above.21
19 It is unique if defaults are proportional.
20 Deviation at the output division stage cannot be preferable since breakdown is triggered in either case, and ai may not be optimal in
the breakdown.
21 A DRC is equivalent to a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium relative to future reversion to this Nash equilibrium. Here,
strategies are infinite sequences of history-dependent actions and consumption claims. Punishment consisting of immediate triggering
of the breakdown, and repeated play of the (dominant) Nash equilibrium of the breakdown game thereafter, is subgame perfect (each
agent just demands the whole output after any deviation (i.e., off the equilibrium path), triggering the breakdown game each period).
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Let Dsi (a j) denote the deviation utility: the best discounted payoff that agent i can get by deviating, given
agent j’s putative action a j in state s. It is defined recursively by
Dsi (a j) := u
N
i (a j,s)+δ∑r∈S pisrDri (aNEj (r)),
where Dri (a
NE
j (r)) is the deviation utility from the play of the Nash equilibrium in state r. Given our hold-up
assumption (see Assumption 3), it follows that the deviation utility is continuous, differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave in the action of the other agent (Lemma 3).
We stress that replacing the Nash reversion punishments by any state dependent continuation utilities that are
no greater the Nash reversion punishments leaves all the characterization results we derive intact. In particular,
optimal punishments satisfy this property. Equally, if agents can take state-dependent outside options at the
start of any period, then, provided these outside options satisfy the condition that they are no greater the Nash
reversion punishments, all our results apply.22
Since an agent can always take the option of receiving her breakdown utility, the deviation utility provides
a lower bound (as a function of the other agent’s action) on the discounted utility an agent gets in any DRC.
Hence, {a(st),c(st)}∞t=0 is a DRC if it is feasible and if for every st , and i, j = 1,2, i 6= j,
Vi(st) := ui(ci(st)−ai(st))+E
[
∑∞τ=t+1 δ τ−tui(ci(sτ)−ai(sτ)) | st
]
≥ Dsti (a j(st)).(2)
The continuation utility Vi(st) is the discounted utility that agent i anticipates from the contract after the history
st . The right hand side of (2) is the deviation utility agent i gets from deviating from the recommended action
after the history st . We refer to the inequalities (2) as the self-enforcing constraints. Whenever (2) holds with
equality, we say that agent i is constrained. Otherwise, we say that agent i is unconstrained.
DRCs exist. For example, the trivial contract that has ai(st) = aNEi (st) and ci(s
t) = φ sti (a
NE(st)) for all st
is both feasible and self-enforcing and therefore a DRC. We show below (see Lemma 8), that there exist
other non-trivial DRCs. Corresponding to any DRC, {a(st),c(st)}∞t=0, and initial state s0, is a pair of lifetime
utilities (V1(s0),V2(s0)). Given the set of DRCs, let Vs0 denote the set of the corresponding lifetime utilities.
Our objective is to characterize the Pareto-frontier of the set Vs0 . We refer to DRCs that correspond to this
Pareto-frontier as optimal contracts (OCs) and refer to the corresponding actions as optimal actions. We say
that agent i underinvests (or that the action is inefficiently low) at some date t in an OC if the optimal actions are
such that ai(st)< a∗i (a j,s) and say the agent overinvests (or the action is inefficiently high) if ai(s
t)> a∗i (a j,s).
22 For example, if in periods after a default the breakdown consumptions/utilities were lower than they are in an on-going relationship,
then our results still hold.
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Given the stochastic history st , we can treat an OC as a stochastic process for (a,c). We will be interested in
the long-run behaviour of this process and whether it converges, and if so, whether convergence is dependent
on s0 or V1(s0).
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
This section establishes some preliminary results on the Pareto-frontier of the set of DRCs and optimal
actions. Section 4 will consider the case where agents are risk neutral and Section 5 the case where agents are
risk averse.
3.1. Relationship to the Nash actions
Henceforth, we restrict attention to OCs. Existence of OCs follows straightforwardly from the fact that the set
Vs0 is compact (Lemma 4). Optimal actions are never below the Nash reaction functions, ai(s
t)≥ aNi (a j(st),st)
(Lemma 5). If the action of one of the agents, say i, were below the Nash reaction function, a Pareto
improvement could be found by increasing that agent’s action a small amount. Although the deviation utility
of the other agent increases (by hold-up), her consumption can be increased to prevent a violation of her
self-enforcing constraint, and there is sufficient extra output remaining to more than compensate agent i for the
increase in his/her action. This property then implies that actions can never be below the Nash equilibrium
actions, a(st)≥ aNE(st). Since it has been shown that aNi (a j,s)> 0 (Lemma 2), the Nash equilibrium actions
are strictly positive, and therefore, it follows that optimal actions are always positive too.
Next, consider the case where an agent, say agent 1, gets allocated all of the output in an OC. Lemma 6
shows that in this case agent 1 is unconstrained. Intuitively, in the current period agent 1 is receiving more of
output than she would obtain in the breakdown game, if she held her action constant (because, by Assumption 3,
agent 2 can claim a positive share of output in the breakdown game). Moreover, the continuation utility cannot
be lower than the deviation continuation utility. However, the intuition is not conclusive because agent 1 need
not hold her action constant and can optimize her action when deviating. Nevertheless, the proof of Lemma 6
shows how to adapt the argument to deal with this case (see the Supplementary Material).
3.2. Recursive formulation
We now use a recursive programming approach to examine OCs. Lemma 3 shows that there is a one-
to-one relationship between an agent’s action and the deviation utility of the other agent. It is convenient
for the recursive formulation to change variables and use the deviation utilities of the two agents instead
of actions. This change allows a direct comparison between two of the choice variables in the recursive
formulation: the deviation utilities and the continuation utilities, and means that the corresponding self-
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enforcing constraints are linear in these choice variables. Thus, let d j := Dsi (a j) and let g
s
i (d j) := (D
s
i )
−1(d j).
With this change in variables, surplus is zs(d1,d2) := zs(gs2(d1),g
s
1(d2)), with output y
s(d1,d2) defined similarly.
It is also useful to work with net consumption xi as a choice variable instead of consumption ci. Given the
properties of Dsi (a j) (Lemma 3), the functions g
s
j(di) are continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly convex. Let D(s) := {(d1,d2) = (Ds2(a1),Ds1(a2)) | (a1,a2) ∈ R2+}. The contract {d(st),x(st)}∞t=0
is feasible if ∑i xi(st) ≤ zst (d(st)) (total consumption does not exceed output) for every history st . For
actions and consumption to be non-negative, it must also satisfy d(st) ∈ D(st) for every history st and
xi(st)+ g
st
j (di(s
t))≥ 0 for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and every history st . It is a DRC if it also satisfies the self-enforcing
constraints Vi(st)≥ d j(st) for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, and every history st . The Markov assumption on the evolution
of states and the infinite time horizon, together with the observation that all the self-enforcing constraints are
forward looking, means that the set of continuation utilities corresponding to a DRC depends only on the
state r and is independent of the past history. The projection of the Pareto-frontier of this set onto agent 1’s
continuation utility will be shown to be a non-degenerate closed interval (Lemma 7 proves the interval is closed
and Lemma 8 that it is non-degenerate) that we denote by [
¯
V r1 ,V¯
r
1 ].
23 Hence, the problem of finding OCs is
reduced to one of finding, for each s ∈S and for each V1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ], a pair (d,x) and V
r
1 for each r ∈S , the
continuation utilities of agent 1, such that
[P1] V s2 (V1) = max
d∈D(s),x≥
¯
x,(V r1∈R)r∈S
{
u2(x2)+δ∑r∈S pisrV r2 (V r1 )
}
subject to
u1(x1)+δ∑r∈S pisrV r1 ≥V1: λ(3a)
V1 ≥ d2 : µ1(3b)
u2(x2)+δ∑r∈S pisrV r2 (V r1 )≥ d1: µ2(3c)
V r1 ≥ ¯V
r
1 : δpisrν
r
1(3d)
V r1 ≤ V¯ r1 : δpisrνr2(3e)
xi + gsj(di)≥ 0 : i, j = 1,2, i 6= j γi(3f)
x1 + x2 ≤ zs(d1,d2): ψ(3g)
23 Intuitively, the interval is non-empty because hold-up creates an inefficiency and provided δ > 0, repeated game arguments allow
cooperation to improve on the breakdown Nash equilibrium.
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where the non-negative Lagrangian multipliers are indicated after each inequality.24 The expected discounted
utility V1 of agent 1 (in state s) is the state variable in this programming problem. The value function V s2 (V1)
represents the Pareto-frontier of the set of DRCs in the space of continuation utilities.25 It describes how
the maximum continuation utility to agent 2 changes as the continuation utility of agent 1 is changed. The
inequality (3a) requires that the contract delivers at least the current discounted utility and is referred to as the
promise-keeping constraint. The inequalities (3b) and (3c) are the self-enforcing constraints corresponding to
the inequalities given in (2). The constraints (3d) and (3e) reflect that the continuation utility for agent 1 in
state r must lie in the interval [
¯
V r1 ,V¯
r
1 ].
26 Inequalities (3f) and (3g) are the feasibility constraints. We denote a
solution to [P1] by (ds(V1),xs(V1)) and continuation utilities (V
s,r
1 (V1)). It will be shown that d
s(V1) is unique;
however, xs(V1) and V
s,r
1 (V1) need not be.
27 Corresponding to this solution, and abusing notation, we define
the surplus zs(V1) := zs(ds1(V1),d
s
2(V1)). We discuss the properties of z
s(V1) below, but we refer to the maximal
value of zs(V1) for V1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ] as the constrained maximal surplus and the actions that maximize this surplus
as the constrained surplus-maximizing (CSM) actions. Let a¯(s) denote the CSM action in state s.28 If the CSM
actions are equal to the first-best actions a¯(s) = a∗(s) (and hence the constrained maximal surplus equals the
first-best surplus), then we say that the first-best is sustainable in state s. We denote the set of states in which
the first-best actions are sustainable asS∗ ⊆S and denote its complement byS c∗ (it is possible thatS∗ = /0
orS c∗ = /0). A first-best allocation (FBA) will involve the first best actions, a∗(s) in each state and date and
complete risk-sharing (that is, net consumption x∗(s) with x∗1(s)+ x
∗
2(s) = z
s(a∗(s)) such that u′2(x
∗
2(s)/u
′
1(x
∗
1)
is constant over all states and dates).
24 The linear independence constraint qualification holds unless the constraints (3f) are inactive and u′2(∂ z
s/∂a1)dgs2(d1)/dd1 = 1.
This constraint qualification can fail, but it only fails at V1 = V¯ s1 where the slope of the Pareto-frontier is infinite (examples where the
constraint qualification fails at this point can be constructed). Thus, apart from V1 = V¯ s1 , the linear independence constraint qualification
holds and the Lagrangian multipliers in the first-order conditions (reported below in sub-section 3.4) exist and are unique. We can also
ignore points V1 = V¯ s1 without loss of generality: if V1(s0)< V¯
s0
1 , then we will show that V1 6= V¯ s1 for any state s; if V1(s0) = V¯ s01 , then
it will be possible to reformulate the problem maximizing the utility of agent 1 for a given V2 for agent 2 and the relevant constraint
qualification will be satisfied.
25 The value function is a fixed point of the mapping defined by [P1]. As is well-known, this mapping is not a contraction, but it is
possible to generate a sequence of functions that converges to the value function by starting with some suitable function, such as the
first-best frontier. For details on such an approach see, for example, Thomas and Worrall (1994).
26 We shall show below that these constraints are not an important part of the solution.
27 When we consider the risk averse case in Section 5, it will be shown that xs(V1) and V
s,r
1 (V1) are unique. In the risk-neutral case
considered in Section 4, xs(V1) and V
s,r
1 (V1) are not in general unique because risk-neutral agents care only about discounted utility
and not the timing of net consumption. However, we will show that the slope of V s,r1 (V1) is uniquely determined and whenever x
s(V1)
is not uniquely determined, actions are chosen efficiently.
28 In principle, there may be DRCs in which there are actions that achieve a higher surplus. Our definition considers only OCs.
However, in both the risk-neutral and risk averse cases that we consider below, the two concepts coincide and the CSM actions do
maximize zs(d1,d2) subject to the self-enforcing constraints (see Theorem 1 and Lemma 14). It will also be shown below that in the
cases we consider, the CSM actions are unique.
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An OC is computed recursively. Start from some given initial value for agent 1’s lifetime utility, V1(s0)
in state s0. The solution to the programming problem provides optimal values for d(s0) and x(s0) in state
s0 by setting V1 = V1(s0) in [P1]. The solution also determines the continuation utilities for V
s0,r
1 (V1(s0)) in
each possible subsequent state r. At date t = 1 and history s1 = (s0,s1), the value for V1 is determined by the
solution for the continuation utility at date t = 0 for the appropriate state and the solution to the date t = 1
programme determines d(s1) and x(s1). The process is repeated to determine {d(st),x(st)}∞t=0. Doing this for
each feasible initial value of the lifetime utility V1(s0) determines the set of OCs.
3.3. Concavity, continuity and differentiability
The programming problem [P1] is not necessarily concave. This is for two related reasons: first we have not
shown that the Pareto-frontiers V r2 (·) are concave; and second, even if the Pareto-frontiers were concave, the
constraint set need not be convex. The reason for this non-convexity of the constraint set is that the deviation
utility D j(ai) is concave in the action of the other agent. Therefore, in taking a convex combination of actions,
the deviation utility from the average action is higher than the average of the deviation utilities. Thus, the
self-enforcing constraints (2) may not be satisfied at the average actions. In the formulation of [P1] with d and
x as the choice variables this is manifested in two ways. First, zs(d) is a composite function and need not be
concave in d, and therefore, at an average of the ds, the constraint (3g) may be violated. Secondly, since gsj(di)
is strictly convex, taking an average of (di,xi) and (d′i ,x
′
i) might violate the non-negativity constraint (3f). To
address these issues we present two alternative assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 4: The function zs(d)+ gsj(di) :D(s)→ R+ is concave in d for each i, j = 1,2, j 6= i.
ASSUMPTION 5: (a) zs(d):D(s)→ R is strictly concave in d and (b) any solution to [P1] has xi > 0 for
i = 1,2 and for each st .
Under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, the Pareto-frontier is concave on [
¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ] (Lemma 7). Under
Assumption 5, it easily checked that the constraint set is also convex.29 We will use Assumption 4 in considering
the case where agents are risk neutral in Section 4 and Assumption 5 in considering the case where agents are
risk averse in Section 5.
Although Assumptions 4 and 5 are not directly in terms of the primitives of the model, it is possible to
check conditions on the primitives where the Assumptions are satisfied. Assumption 4 requires that the
production function is more concave than the corresponding deviation utility. This condition is not completely
straightforward because the curvature of the deviation utility depends both on the utility and production
29 It can also be checked that if [P1] is written with c and d as choice variables, then a sufficient condition for convexity of the constraint
set is that ys(d) is concave in d. This condition is more stringent than concavity of zs(d) and will fail in a number of natural cases.
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functions. However, this condition is satisfied in many reasonable examples and Assumption 4 is a generalized
version of the condition given in Thomas and Worrall (1994).30
It is easily checked that Assumption 4 implies part (a) of Assumption 5. Again, part (a) of Assumption 5
requires that the curvature of the deviation utility is less than the curvature of surplus as a function of actions.31
Part (b) of Assumption 5 is a direct assumption on the OC. However, the assumption is easily justified by placing
additional assumptions on the utility function. For example, for utility functions (such as those with constant
relative risk aversion with coefficient of risk aversion greater than or equal to one) where limx→0 u(x) =−∞, it
is clear that a solution of [P1] has xi > 0. More generally, if ui(0) is sufficiently low, then xi(st) > 0 in any
OC.32 In either case, because optimal actions are positive, part (b) of Assumption 5 implies that consumption
of both agents is positive at the solution of [P1]. Hence, part (b) of Assumption 5 means that the non-negativity
constraints on consumption, (3f), can be ignored and the associated multipliers are zero at the solution of [P1].
Given concavity, it can be shown that the Pareto-frontier is continuously differentiable (Lemma 8). In the
existing literature on limited commitment without actions, differentiability is established by observing that
neither self-enforcing constraint is binding in the interior.33 This is not true here; indeed we will show that
both constraints may be binding. Moreover, in the one-sided action case the value function can fail to be
differentiable.34 It is perhaps surprising, then, that in this two-sided case we are able to establish differentiability.
The key observation is that since, as we have already shown, optimal actions are positive, it is possible to
vary both actions simultaneously, holding the future utilities constant, so as to vary V1 whilst satisfying the
self-enforcing and feasibility constraints. Varying both actions in this way allows a differentiable relationship
between V2 and V1 to be established, to which the Pareto-frontier must be an upper envelope. Differentiability
then follows from applying the well-known lemma of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979). The same approach
can be used to show that the Pareto-frontier can be extended to the left (right) if the absolute slope at
¯
V1 (V¯1) is
30 To illustrate a case where Assumption 4 is satisfied, suppose that agents are risk neutral with ui(x) = x, production is additive and
the breakdown consumption in each state is φi(a) = θi1 f1(a1)+θi2 f2(a2), where for notational simplicity the dependence of θ , f etc.
on s is suppressed. For Assumption 4 to be satisfied it is sufficient that f ′′i / f ′i ≤−g′′j /g′j. By definition, −g′′j /g′j = D′′j /D′j. With this
specification for φi(a), D′′j /D′j = f ′′i / f ′i , and hence Assumption 4 is satisfied.
31 It is also easily checked that there are parameterizations such that part (a) of Assumption 5 is satisfied. These will typically require
that agents are not too risk averse. For example, consider the case where preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion with
coefficient α , the same for both agents, and the production function is separable and given by ys(a1,a2) = (β )−1((a1)β + (a2)β ).
Furthermore, suppose each agent can expropriate a proportion θ of output in the case of default. Then, it is easily checked that, for
any β ∈ (0,1): if θ ∈ (1/e,1/2], then zs(d) is concave for α <−eθ(1−θ)−1 logθ ; similarly if θ ∈ (0,1/e], then zs(d) is concave for
α < (1−θ)−1.
32 More precisely, define ψ := mins[φ si (a
NE(s))−aNEi (s)]. Since the deviation utility in any OC is bounded below by the discounted
utility from receiving the (positive) Nash outcome payoff each period, it follows that for any ui(·), and holding ui(xi) fixed for xi ≥ ψ ,
if ui(0) is sufficiently low relative to ui(ψ), and given that future continuation utilities are bounded above (independently of ui(0)),
xi(st)> 0 in any OC since otherwise the self-enforcing constraint (2) is violated.
33 See, for example, Thomas and Worrall (1988).
34 Typically, it fails if the first-best level of investment is not sustainable. See, for example, Thomas and Worrall (1994).
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positive (finite) to establish that V s(+)2 (¯
V1) = 0 and V
s(−)
2 (V¯1) =−∞, where V s(+)2 denotes the right and V s(−)2
the left derivative.
3.4. First-order conditions
It has been shown (Lemma 8) that the Pareto-frontier is continuously differentiable and that the range
of absolute slopes of the frontier is R+ ∪{∞}. Let σs(V1) := −V s′2 (V1) and σ+s,r(V1) := −V r′2 (V s,r1 (V1)) be
the (absolute) slopes of the Pareto-frontiers, where σs: [¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ]→ R+∪{∞} is strictly increasing. Lemma 9
establishes that dsi (V1) is a continuous function. The first-order conditions for [P1] are given by:
σ+s,r(V1)−σs(V1) =−σs(V1)
µ2
1 +µ2
+
µ1
1 +µ2
+
νr1−νr2
1 +µ2
(4a)
σ+s,r(V1) =
u′2(·)
u′1(·)
+
γ2− γ1
u′1(·)(1 +µ2)
+
νr1−νr2
1 +µ2
(4b)
µ j
1 +µ2
=
∂ zs
∂di
(
u′2(·)+
γ2
1 +µ2
)
+ gs ′j (di)
γi
1 +µ2
i = 1,2 and i 6= j.(4c)
The first point to notice is that the multipliers νri = 0. To see this suppose that νr1 > 0. In this case
V s,r1 (V1) = ¯
V r1 , σ+s,r(V1) = 0 and by a complementary slackness condition νr2 = 0. Then using equation (4a),
−σs(V1)−µ1 = νr1 > 0 which gives a contradiction since σs(V1) and µ1 are non-negative. A similar argument
can be made to show that νr2 = 0.35 Since νri = 0, it follows that σ+s,r(V1) is the same for each future state
r ∈S and we write σ+s (V1) for this common future value. This property greatly simplifies the dynamics of the
contracting problem.
It follows directly from the first-order conditions (4c) that in an OC (i) there is only ever underinvestment,
ai(st)< a∗i (a j(s
t),s), if at least one of the agents is constrained; and (ii) if agent i has positive consumption,
then he/she does not overinvest, ai(st)≤ a∗i (a j(st),s) (see Lemma 10).36
There is also a simple corollary to these results: a) both agents cannot be overinvesting (because one agent
must have positive consumption); b) an agent cannot be permanently overinvesting because consumption must
be positive at some future date because otherwise the self-enforcing constraint would not be satisfied.
35 The simplest way to see this is to reverse the order in the programming problem and consider maximizing the utility of agent 1 for a
given V2 for agent 2.
36 To see the intuition for the first part, suppose that agent 1 is unconstrained. If agent 2 were underinvesting, he could increase
investment and generate more surplus. The surplus would be enough to compensate him for the extra investment and agent 1 won’t
default because she is unconstrained. Thus, it would be possible to find a better contract, yielding a contradiction. Similarly, to see
the second part, suppose that agent 1 is overinvesting. Then she could reduce her investment. This relaxes agent 2’s self-enforcing
constraint (keeping consumptions now and future promises the same). However, output has fallen, so aggregate consumption must fall.
If agent 1 has positive consumption, it is possible to keep the consumption of agent 2 the same, while the utility of agent 1 increases
because she has cut her investment from above the conditionally efficient level.
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4. RISK NEUTRALITY
For this section, we use Assumption 4 and suppose that both agents are risk neutral, in particular, that
ui(x) = x and that ¯
xi = −∞ for i = 1,2. In this case, the non-negativity constraint on consumption (limited
liability) plays a key role. We show that an OC exhibits a two-stage property. It starts with a backloading
phase in which one of the agents consumes all of the output. This agent never overinvests, while the other
agent overinvests. The second phase is stationary and actions are CSM. Therefore, if s ∈S∗, actions are at the
first-best for both agents. If s ∈S c∗ , both agents underinvest and have positive consumption.37
With risk neutrality, the lower bound for the deviation utility (Lemma 3) is strictly positive. Therefore, the
Pareto-frontier is defined on Λs := [
¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ]⊂ R++. Lemma 7 has shown that the Pareto-frontier is concave.
With risk-neutrality, it can be shown (Lemma 11) that the frontier is strictly concave if at least one of the
self-enforcing constraints is binding, but if V1 is in an interval where the efficient actions are sustainable (such
values may not exist), then the frontier is linear with slope of −1 in this interval. Lemma 1 together with
Lemma 7 imply that the CSM actions are unique.
It is useful to consider three (not necessarily disjoint) subsets of Λs: As = {V1 ∈ Λs:co1 = 0}, Bs = {V1 ∈
Λs:co1 > 0 and c
o
2 > 0} and Cs = {V1 ∈ Λs:co2 = 0} where (co1,co2) represents an optimal value for consumption
at V1. Note that As∪Bs∪Cs = Λs.38 We know from our previous discussion that if agent 1 overinvests, this
can only occur for V1 ∈ As, and if agent 2 overinvests, this occurs for V1 ∈Cs. Also, since optimal actions are
positive, output and aggregate consumption is positive, and consequently, it is not possible that both γi > 0 for
the same V1. Equally, for V1 ∈ As, c2 > 0, and hence, the multiplier γ2 = 0.39 We also know from Lemma 6 that
if c1 = 0, and therefore, that agent 2 gets all the consumption, then agent 2 is unconstrained, and hence, µ2 = 0.
Likewise, for V1 ∈Cs, γ1 = µ1 = 0. Consumption for both agents is positive for V1 ∈ Bs, so that γ1 = γ2 = 0.
Recall that the action ai and deviation utility di are monotonically related through the function gsj. Thus, it is
possible to work with either, and to simplify some of the equations, we sometimes work with both. Consider
the subset As. Using γ2 = µ2 = 0, we have from the first-order conditions (4b) and (4c) that:
σ+s (V1) = 1− γ1 =
∂ys(a1,a2)
∂a1
,(5a)
σs(V1) = 1− γ1−µ1 = ∂y
s(a1,a2)
∂a1
− ∂ z
s(d1,d2)
∂d2
.(5b)
37 Depending on the initial division of surplus, the OC might start off in the stationary phase.
38 As can be non-empty and Cs empty or vice-versa (examples of this type can be constructed).
39 Since the multiplier is unique, the conclusion that γ2 = 0 is valid even if V1 also belongs to Bs or to Cs. The same argument can be
made for the other subsets and multipliers.
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Hence, for V1 ∈ As, 1≥ σ+s (V1)≥ σs(V1). From equation (5a) it follows that if σ+s (V1)< 1, then γ1 > 0, and
hence, the consumption of agent 1 is zero. Equally, ∂ys(a1,a2)/∂a1 < 1, so that agent 1 is overinvesting. From
equation (5b) it follows that agent 2 doesn’t overinvest and may underinvest. A similar set of conditions apply
for V1 ∈Cs and imply 1≤ σ+s (V1)≤ σs(V1) so that agent 1 doesn’t overinvest and if σ+s (V1)> 1, then agent 2
has zero consumption and overinvests. For V1 ∈ Bs, the first-order conditions show that σ+s (V1) = 1, so there is
no overinvestment. As a measure of the extent of overinvestment let ζ si := max{0,−ln(∂ys(a1,a2)/∂a1)} and
ζ s := max{ζ s1 ,ζ s2}. Hence, ζ s > 0 if there is overinvestment and is a measure of the distortion of the marginal
product below the efficient level.40
To consider how variables change over time in an OC, it is useful to write ζ (t) for overinvestment at date t
(when there is more than one state, then ζ (t) is the value of a random variable at date t). It can be easily
checked from the first-order conditions that ζ (t) converges monotonically (weakly decreasing) to ζ (t) = 0
with probability one (see Lemma 12). This convergence result derives from two properties. First, because the
action of an agent is positive, the agent will need positive consumption at some time in the future to compensate
him/her for the cost of actions, otherwise, he/she would default. Second, discounting and the boundedness
of the output function mean that the time of this positive consumption must be bounded. Once ζ (t) = 0 has
been reached, it follows from the first-order conditions that σ(t+1) = 1 in every state and there is one of two
possibilities: either both of the self-enforcing constraints bind or neither of them do.
Using this convergence result, we derive our two-phase characterization theorem. Here, for convenience, we
also treat contracts as sequences of random variables, writing ai(t) rather than ai(st) etc.41
THEOREM 1: In an OC, there is a random time tˆ, 0≤ tˆ < ∞ with probability one, such that:
Stationary phase (t ≥ tˆ): Optimal actions maximize the surplus zs(a1,a2) subject to the self-enforcing con-
straints, and hence, are CSM. The optimal actions depend only on the state st and are therefore, independent
of the initial conditions. There is no overinvestment: ai(t) ≤ a∗i (a j(t),st) for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j. For st ∈S∗,
then optimal actions and the corresponding surplus are first best: a(t) = a∗(st) and zst (a(t)) = zst (a∗(st)). For
st ∈S c∗ , the self-enforcing constraints bind for both agents, ci > 0 for i = 1,2, and there is underinvestment:
ai(t)< a∗i (a j(t),st)≤ a∗i (st) for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j.
Backloading phase (t < tˆ): Overinvestment declines during the backloading phase: in particular, ζ (t) is
weakly decreasing with ζ (tˆ−1) = 0. Depending on V1(s0) there is an i ∈ {1,2} such that ci(t) = 0, ζi(t)> 0
(ai(t) > a∗i (a j(t),st)) and a j(t) ≤ a∗j(ai(t),st), for 0 ≤ t < tˆ−1, j 6= i. At date tˆ−1, ai(tˆ−1) ≤ a∗i (stˆ−1) and
40 In subset As, ζ s =− lnσ+s (V1) and in subset Cs, ζ s = lnσ+s (V1).
41 The Theorem shows that in the stationary phase actions depend only on the current state. The same cannot be said about the division
of the surplus because, given risk-neutrality, if the first-best actions can be sustained in some state, then there may be an arbitrariness in
how consumptions are allocated over time even for a given initial split of utilities.
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a j(tˆ−1)< a∗j(stˆ−1). Moreover, if at any two dates t and t ′ > t the same state s occurs, then underinvestment
diminishes and surplus increases: in particular, ∂ys(a(t))/∂a j ≥ ∂ys(a(t ′))/∂a j ≥ 1 for tˆ− 1 ≥ t ′ > t and
zs(a(t ′))≥ zs(a(t)) for tˆ ≥ t ′ > t.
For a given value of agent 1’s lifetime utility V1(s0), there corresponds a value σ0. From Theorem 1, we can
describe a typical path as follows. Suppose σ0 < 1 (a symmetric argument applies if σ0 > 1). Then one of
two possible scenarios applies. Either V1(s0) ∈ Bs0 or V1(s0) ∈ As0 . In the former case, tˆ = 1 and the contract
moves to the stationary phase in each state at the next period. In the latter case, either ζ1(0) = 0 and tˆ = 1 as
in the previous case, or ζ1(0) > 0 in which case tˆ > 1 and there is a backloading phase in which c1(t) = 0
and agent 1 overinvests. Correspondingly, V1 is sufficiently low that agent 1’s self-enforcing constraint binds
and agent 2 underinvests to avoid violating agent 1’s self-enforcing constraint; by contrast V2 is high enough
that agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint is slack.42 In this phase, backloading agent 1’s consumption allows
her continuation utility to rise, which relaxes future self-enforcing constraints and allows a2 to rise too. Since
agents are risk neutral, they are indifferent to the timing of consumption flows (keeping the action plans fixed) if
the expected discounted value is the same. Therefore, backloading of consumption is costless and consumption
is backloaded to the maximum extent possible, that is, c1(t) = 0 in this phase, allowing maximum surplus to be
achieved as quickly as possible. Furthermore, by increasing a1(t) above a∗1(a2(t),s) additional backloading
can be achieved. This decreases agent 1’s current utility, and because consumption is backloaded, allocates the
extra output to agent 2. However, since a1(t) is inefficiently high, this additional backloading is achieved at the
cost of a reduction in the surplus.
The incentive to overinvest diminishes over time (as can be seen from (5a), σ+(t) approaches 1).43 Equally,
if the same state recurs along the path, underinvestment diminishes as the self-enforcing constraint is relaxed.
The combined effect is that surplus zs(a(t)) increases, and reaches a maximum when σ(t) = 1 (Lemma 13).
At values of V1 where σ(t) = 1, the constrained maximal surplus is achieved and optimal actions are CSM. In
addition, when σ(t) = 1, V1 +V2 is also maximized (given the concavity of the Pareto-frontier). Once σ(t) = 1,
as noted above, we have ζ (t) = 0, there is no overinvestment and the OC is stationary from that point on.
That there is overinvestment in the backloading phase is perhaps surprising given the hold-up problem and
given that the literature, mentioned in the Introduction, that considers the case where only one agent takes an
action finds that there is never any overinvestment. To see that overinvestment cannot occur in the one-sided
42 This characterization applies so long as ζ1(t)> 0 and assuming agent 1’s self-enforcing constraint binds with a positive multiplier.
With more than one state, we cannot rule out the possibility that in some states deviation utilities are so low that the self-enforcing
constraints may not bind even when σ(t)< 1. In this latter case, from (4c) and (4a), a2(t) = a∗2(a1(t),s) and σ
+(t) = σ(t).
43 If the output function is additively separable, then the monotonicity property in the backloading phase of Theorem 1 implies that
ai(t ′)≤ ai(t) and a j(t ′)≥ a j(t) for dates tˆ ≥ t ′ > t when the same state s occurs at date t and t ′.
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case, suppose that only agent 1 takes an action, and that agent 2 gets all or most of the surplus from the
relationship. Then, the OC will be stationary with agent 1 being compensated for her action each period and
agent 2 receiving sufficient to not want to expropriate. There is no benefit from backloading agent 1’s utility.44
In particular, it can only increase agent 2’s incentive to renege in the future, potentially necessitating lower (and
more inefficient) future actions by agent 1. Thus, there is no overinvestment. Now, continue to suppose that
agent 2 gets all or most of the surplus from the relationship but instead suppose that agent 2 also undertakes an
action that is subject to hold-up. In this case, stationarity would imply that agent 2’s action is, and remains, low
to prevent agent 1 reneging, given that agent 1’s surplus from the relationship is assumed to be low. In this
case, backloading agent 1’s utility allows agent 2 to increase her action in the longer run, even though there
may be a cost in terms of a corresponding reduction in agent 1’s action in the longer run. As explained above,
this may imply overinvestment by agent 1 in the early periods to speed up the backloading phase.
In summary, at most one agent’s utility is backloaded, and an OC converges to, and attains, a stationary
allocation that maximizes surplus and the sum of lifetime utilities. This one sided-nature of the OC in which
only one of the two agents is ever subject to backloading, and convergence result itself, is perhaps surprising in
view of the possibility that property rights, and hence, deviation utilities, can shift radically between states.
5. RISK AVERSION
For this section we suppose that agents are risk averse. In particular, we strengthen Assumption 1 and assume
that ui is strictly concave for i = 1,2. We also replace Assumption 4 with Assumption 5. That is, in particular,
it is assumed that net consumption and hence, consumption is strictly positive in an OC. It will follow from
this that overinvestment is no longer a feature of an OC. As we have seen in Section 4, under risk neutrality,
the allocation of net consumption between agents may vary, potentially considerably, across states even in the
long-run. Thus, it is important to examine how allowing for risk aversion affects OCs.45
5.1. Characterization of Optimal Contracts
In this sub-section, we first consider the properties of the optimal contract as V1 varies in a given state. Next,
we consider how the contract is updated period-by-period: in particular, how the ratio of marginal utilities
changes from one period to the next. In the following sub-section, we consider the long-run properties of the
contract and show that the contract evolves towards a stationary distribution that may, or may not, depend on
the value of agent 1’s lifetime utility V1(s0).
44 Agent 2’s utility would be backloaded (i.e., c2(t) = 0 initially) if agent 1 gets most of the surplus, allowing agent 1’s action to be
increased in the long run without agent 2 wanting to renege. Since agent 2 does not take an action, overinvestment cannot result.
45 As stated in the introduction, the two-agent version with quasi-linear utility in Acemoglu et al. (2011) corresponds to a limiting case
of our model where in each state one agent has all the property rights.
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First, consider [P1] under risk aversion and Assumption 5. By Lemma 7, the Pareto-frontier is strictly
concave. This means that not only is dsi (·) a continuous function of V1 (Lemma 9) but also that xsi (·) and V s,r1 (·)
are continuous functions of V1.46 Our previous discussion of [P1] has shown that the endpoint constraints (3d)
and (3e) do not bind. Equally, by part (b) of Assumption 5, xi > 0 in an OC and hence, since actions are
nonnegative, the consumption constraints (3f) do not bind. Since constraints (3f) do not bind, setting γi = 0,
i = 1,2, in equation (4c) shows that ∂ zs/∂di ≥ 0, i = 1,2. This implies, asi (V1)≤ asi (a j(V1),s), i, j = 1,2, i 6= j.
That is, there is no overinvestment: actions are never above the conditionally efficient levels.
To discuss how asi (V1) varies with V1, it is necessary to consider the surplus function z
s(V1). Recall that
actions corresponding to the maximal value of zs(V1) are called constrained surplus-maximizing (CSM)
actions. As mentioned in Footnote 28, Lemma 14 establishes that the CSM actions maximize zs(a1,a2) subject
to the self-enforcing constraints V1 ≥ Ds1(a2) and V2 ≥ Ds2(a1). Next, Lemma 15 establishes that zs(V1) is
differentiable and concave in V1. It need not be strictly concave, however, because if neither self-enforcing
constraint binds, then optimal actions are first-best and hence, zs(V1) may have a flat section at its maximum
(zs(V1) cannot be flat for all V1 ∈ [¯V1,V¯1] for reasons to be explained in Lemma 16). Given this concavity of
zs(V1) and the uniqueness of ds(V1), it follows that the CSM actions are unique.
Both the current action asi (V1), and the evolution of the contract between t and t+1, depend crucially on
whether the current value of V1 is above or below the maximizer(s) of zs(V1). Consider values of V1 where the
surplus function zs(V1) is increasing in V1. Then, constraint (3b) binds and ds2(V1) =V1 (see, Lemma 16). That is,
as in the risk-neutral case, for low values of V1, agent 2’s action is kept inefficiently low, as2(V1)< a
∗
2(a
s
1(V1),s),
to prevent agent 1 from defaulting. For a higher value of V1 (but still with dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0), the self-enforcing
constraint is relaxed allowing a2 (correspondingly d2) to increase, increasing surplus, as confirmed formally
below. (Whether agent 2’s constraint also binds for V1 such that zs(V1) is increasing depends on whether s ∈S∗
or s ∈S c∗ , which is discussed next.) Likewise ds1(V1) = V s2 (V1) for any V1 where zs(V1) is decreasing: agent 1’s
action is inefficiently low, as1(V1)< a
∗
1(a
s
2(V1),s), for high values of V1.
In fact we can distinguish two cases in a given state s. For s ∈S∗ (see Figure 1a), first-best actions can be
sustained by definition and there is a corresponding interval of values for V1 such that surplus is maximized. We
define χ¯s1 and
¯
χs1 as the lower and upper values of this interval.
47 Each agent’s constraint binds only on one side
of maximum surplus, that is, agent 1’s when zs(V1) is increasing and agent 2’s when it is decreasing. So, while
46 This can be easily shown by adapting the proof of Lemma 9, using the strict concavity of the Pareto-frontiers and the strict concavity
of the utility functions.
47 More generally whether s ∈S∗ or s ∈S c∗ , there are two values χ¯s1 and
¯
χs1 such that agent 1’s constraint binds for V1 ≤ χ¯s1, while
agent 2’s constraint binds for V1 ≥
¯
χs1 (see Lemma 16 for details). For s ∈S∗ there is also the knife-edge case where the first-best
actions can just be sustained for V1 = χ¯s1 =
¯
χs1.
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FIGURE 1: Surplus Function zs(V1)
for low values of V1, agent 2 underinvests, but agent 1’s action is conditionally efficient, as1(V1) = a
∗
1(a
s
2(V1),s).
Likewise, for high values of V1, agent 1 underinvests and agent 2’s action is conditionally efficient.48
For s ∈S c∗ (see Figure 1b), surplus is always below the first-best and zs(V1) is strictly concave. The subsets
of V1 where agents are constrained overlap, with both agents being constrained between
¯
χs1 and χ¯
s
1. In particular,
there is a unique value of V1, which we denote by χˆs1, at which z
s(V1) is maximized and both agents are
constrained at this point (with µ1,µ2 > 0). Hence, both actions are inefficiently low at this point.49,50
We now turn to how the contract is updated between dates t and t+1. As already argued, di(V1) and xi(V1)
are functions of V1 and since the Pareto-frontier is strictly concave, the relationship between V1 and the slope of
the Pareto-frontier for a given state is injective. Thus, how the choices (d,x) change over time can be described
by how the slope of the Pareto-frontier changes from one period to the next. Recalling that σs(V1) is the slope
of the current Pareto-frontier and that σ+s (V1) is the common slope of the Pareto-frontiers next period, it can be
48 Note that as1(V1) increases in V1 where z
s(V1) is increasing, but does not increase in V1 where zs(V1) is decreasing. The reason for this
is that although as1(V1) = a
∗
1(a
s
2(V1),s) where z
s(V1) is decreasing in V1, as2(V1) decreases in V1 for such values and by complementarity
of actions a∗1(a2,s) is weakly increasing in a2.
49 So ds1(V1) = V
s
2 (V1) and d
s
2(V1) = V1 for values of V1 ∈ (
¯
χs1, χ¯
s
1) in Figure 1b. The result that both agents may be constrained is in
contrast to pure risk-sharing models with limited commitment, for example, Kocherlakota (1996) or Thomas and Worrall (1988), where
at most one self-enforcing constraint binds at any one time in any non-trivial optimum. The reason that both agents can be constrained
here is that if actions are inefficiently low, it would always improve the contract to increase them until the relevant constraint binds.
50 It is possible that
¯
χs1 = ¯
V s1 , in which case a1 is inefficiently low for all V1, or χ¯
s
1 = V¯
s
1 in which case a2 is inefficiently low for all V1,
or both.
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shown (see Lemma 17) that for each V1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ]
σ+s (V1)−σs(V1) = u′2
dzs(V1)
dV1
.(6)
This equation is easily interpreted. Consider a (small) unit increase in V1. The effect on agent 2’s discounted
utility is to change it by approximately V s ′2 (V1) =−σs(V1) units. One way to effect this change (as good as
any other at the optimum) is to hold the current utility of agent 1 constant (giving any change in the current
surplus to agent 2) and increase V r1 in each state r, the next-period continuation utilities of agent 1, by 1/δ .
The effect on agent 2’s current utility is u′2(dz
s(V1)/dV1). The effect on the discounted continuation utility
of agent 2 is to decrease it by σ+s (V1), the same for all future states. The combined effect for agent 2 is
u′2(dz
s(V1)/dV1)−σ+s (V1). Since the overall change in utility for agent 2 is −σs(V1), we can equate to get
equation (6).
Recall that, from (4b), σ+s (V1) = u′2(x2(V1))/u′1(x1(V1)), the current ratio of marginal utilities. It is intuitive
therefore that σ+s (V1) is increasing in V1 because an increase in V1 may be associated with an increase in current
net consumption of agent 1, lowering the marginal utility of agent 1 with the opposite effect on the marginal
utility of agent 2. That σ+s (V1) is increasing in V1 is formally proved in Lemma 18(i). Since the Pareto-frontier
is strictly concave, σs(V1) is also strictly increasing in V1, there will be a positive relationship between the
slope of the Pareto-frontier this period and next period for a given state, or equivalently between the current
ratio of marginal utilities and the ratio of marginal utilities at the previous date. Given the concavity of zs(V1),
equation (6) therefore can be reinterpreted as showing that for a given state the ratio of marginal utilities
increases when V1 is low (dzs(V1)/dV1 increasing) and decreases when V1 is high (dzs(V1)/dV1 decreasing), or
otherwise does not change. Intuitively, relative to the ratio of marginal utilities at the previous date, the current
consumption shares change in a direction that allows current surplus to increase.
5.2. Convergence
To examine long-run convergence, we again treat choices at date t as random variables and write x1(t) for the
random value of net consumption at date t after history st etc. Define mu(t) := u′2(x2(t))/u
′
1(x1(t)) to be the
ratio of marginal utilities at date t. In the risk-neutral case mu(t) = 1 and our focus was on how overinvestment
as measured by ζ (t) changed over time. Here, there is no overinvestment, by virtue of Assumption 5(b), but
mu(t) may fluctuate over time and our next two theorems focus on the long-run properties of mu(t).
To help explain the dynamics and convergence properties of an OC, we first consider the case of a single
state s. If V1(t) is such that dzs(V1(t))/dV1 > 0 (resp. < 0), by σs(V1) strictly increasing in V1, (6) implies that
V1(t + 1)>V1(t) (resp. <V1(t)). If dzs(V1(t))/dV1 = 0, then V1(t + 1) = V1(t). Thus, the evolution over time
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of V1 is as illustrated by the arrows in Figure 1 with stationary behaviour when zs is the constrained maximal
surplus. In fact, we can show that V1 cannot “overshoot” points where zs is maximal. Recall that a¯(s) denotes
the unique CSM action in state s (= a∗(s) for s ∈S∗). Similarly, let z¯(s) denote the constrained maximal
surplus in state s (= zs(a∗1(s),a
∗
2(s)) for s ∈S∗). Since mu(t) = σ(t + 1) and since it has been established that
σ+s (V1) is increasing in V1, it can be seen from Figure 1 that there is a unique ratio of marginal utilities that
is compatible with surplus maximization in states s ∈S c∗ (Figure 1b) and a (possibly degenerate) interval of
marginal utilities compatible with surplus maximization in states s ∈S∗ (Figure 1a). Note too that once a(t)
and mu(t) are determined, x(t) is uniquely defined and therefore, we can describe convergence of the contract
in terms of convergence of actions and the ratio of marginal utilities. From this we have the following theorem
in the case of a single state:51
THEOREM 2: Suppose that there is a single state s. Then an OC converges to a contract with CSM actions
and hence, constrained maximal surplus. In particular, ||a(t)− a¯(s)||→ 0 and the sequence {zs(t)} is monotone
(constant or increasing) with |zs(t)− z¯(s)| → 0. Moreover, the sequence {mu(t)} is monotonic (increasing,
decreasing or constant depending on the initial condition). (a) If s ∈S∗, then the action sequences {ai(t)}
are monotone (constant or increasing). (b) If s ∈S c∗ , then the action of one of the agents is monotonically
increasing (which agent depends on initial conditions) and the limit of the sequence {mu(t)} is independent of
V1(s0).
This single state case is similar to the risk-neutral case. Actions converge to CSM actions and there is
backloading of the continuation utilities. In particular, the sequence V1(t) is monotonic so that one agent has
his/her continuation utility backloaded. In part (a) where there is an interval of the ratio of marginal utilities
that are compatible with surplus maximization, convergence will be to the lower endpoint of the interval if the
initial MU ratio lies below the interval; to the upper endpoint if initial MU ratio lies above the interval; and the
sequence of MU ratios will be constant if the initial MU ratio is within the interval.
With more than one state, convergence to constrained surplus maximization may not occur because there
is a conflict between risk sharing and surplus maximization. To achieve surplus maximisation in state s the
distribution of consumption may differ from that in s′ 6= s and therefore, an OC must (dynamically) trade-off
risk sharing against surplus maximization.
As just described, there is a (possibly trivial) interval of MU ratios corresponding to maximum surplus in
state s for s ∈S∗. An FBA is sustainable if the CSM actions are efficient in every state and the intersection of
all such intervals for the MU ratios is non-empty. If the intersection is not only non-empty but a non-trivial
51 We use ||·|| to denote the Euclidean norm.
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interval, then there are multiple FBAs. If a FBA is sustainable then convergence is similar to the one state case.
If however, the intersection is empty, an FBA is not sustainable and the MU ratio may not converge to a single
value. It does, under a weak regularity condition, converge to a long-run invariant distribution. To describe the
evolution of the MU ratio, let F(V1(s0))t :R+→ [0,1] denote the distribution function of mu(t) at date t given the
initial value V1(s0). This leads us to the following general convergence theorem.
THEOREM 3: a) Suppose an FBA is sustainable. Then an OC converges with probability one to an FBA:
||a(t)−a∗(st)|| → 0 and the random sequence {mu(t)} is (weakly) monotone, with probability one. If there
exist multiple FBAs, then the limit FBA depends upon V1(s0).
(b) Suppose instead that an FBA is not sustainable. Then, provided piss > 0 for all s, F
(V1(s0))
t converges
weakly to a unique distribution independent of V1(s0). Either (i) this distribution is degenerate, in which case
dynamics are as in part (a), with stationary limit contract with CSM actions in each state, or otherwise (ii) this
distribution is non-degenerate, and current surplus is not maximised in the long run: ||a(t)− a¯(st)|| → 0 with
probability zero.
Parts (a) and part (b)(ii) of Theorem 3 mirror the convergence arguments of Theorem 2. In part (a), there is
convergence to a FBA. There is a (possibly trivial) interval of the ratio of marginal utilities that are compatible
with efficient actions and a constant MU ratio. Convergence will be to the lower endpoint of the interval if the
initial MU ratio lies below the interval; to the upper endpoint if initial MU ratio lies above the interval; and the
sequence of MU ratios will be constant if the initial MU ratio is within the interval. Part (b)(ii) considers the
case where there is a unique MU ratio consistent with CSM actions in each state. Convergence is to the CSM
actions and to this MU ratio.
Part (b)(ii) of Theorem 3 provides a description of what happens when there is a conflict between surplus
maximization and risk sharing. The OC exhibits a second-best property. The MU ratio mu(t) does not settle
down to a single value, and whenever it differs across two dates t−1 and t, actions at date t will not be CSM.52
By contrast, in the risk-neutral case, once the stationary phase is reached surplus is maximized in each state
by varying the continuation utility to allow the constrained maximal surplus to be achieved (Theorem 1). For
example, if the state changes from one in which agent 1 can claim most of output to one in which roles are
reversed, sufficient surplus and future utility is reallocated to agent 2 to satisfy his self-enforcing constraint at
the CSM actions for that state. However, in the risk-averse setting of part (b)(ii) of Theorem 3, risk-sharing
considerations make such an immediate step change undesirable. It is better to hold agent 1’s action at the
52 Formally, mu(t−1) 6= mu(t) implies σ(t) 6= σ(t+1), and thus from (6), dzst (V1(t))/dV1 6= 0. Hence, actions at date t are not CSM,
as claimed.
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later date inefficiently low, keeping agent 2’s default payoff from rising too much; this relaxes the latter’s
self-enforcing constraint so that the share going to agent 2 does not rise to that consistent with CSM actions.53
A more detailed intuition is as follows: suppose to the contrary that the ratio of marginal utilities differs
across two dates t−1 and t, but actions at date t are CSM. Then a simple change in the contract at t−1 and t
can produce a Pareto-improvement. Consider the case where mu(t−1)> mu(t). Initially hold actions fixed at
both dates and increase x1(t) by a small amount, but reduce x1(t−1) to leave V1(t−1) unchanged. If surplus
were unchanged at t, this would improve risk sharing and lead to a Pareto-improvement because V2(t−1)
would increase. However, because x2(t), and hence V2(t), have fallen, agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint may
be violated at the initial actions (and will be, if the CSM actions are below the first-best). In order not to
violate agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint, agent 1’s action at date t can be reduced. Correspondingly, agent 2’s
action can be increased because V1(t) has risen. Critically, although this change may reduce surplus at date t,
it does so only by a second-order amount since, by assumption, the original actions at date t were CSM.54
Consequently, a Pareto-improvement results, contradicting the supposed optimality of the original situation.
5.3. Pure risk-sharing
We now compare our results to the standard limited commitment, two-agent, pure risk-sharing model of
Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon et al. (2002), Thomas and Worrall (1988). To do this, for simplicity we consider
a special case of our hold-up model with additive production (here we return to treating actions ai as choice
variables), ys(a) = f s1(a1) + f
s
2(a2), and proportional defaults, φ
s
i (a) = θ si1 f
s
1(a1) +θ
s
i2 f
s
2(a2) where θ
s
i j ≥ 0,
i, j = 1,2, and ∑2i=1 θ si j = 1, j = 1,2. Our hold-up assumption requires θ si j > 0, i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, all s. Holding
technology and preferences fixed, consider the limit case where hold-up vanishes: θ si j = 0, i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, all
s. This corresponds to the pure-risk sharing model. In any OC of this limit model actions are clearly efficient,
as are actions in the breakdown, so only efficient levels play any role. Agent i’s “endowment” in state s is
f si (a
∗
i (s))−a∗i (s) and breakdown utility is u( f si (a∗i (s))−a∗i (s)).
We establish that the dynamics of the hold-up model converge to that of the risk-sharing model. In the
latter, as is well known, dynamics are summarised in a simple updating rule for mu(t) (which fixes surplus
division given surplus depends only on s). We characterise how the corresponding updating rule in the hold-up
53 The requirement that piss > 0 is a regularity condition to ensure that there can be long enough sequences along which the MU ratio is
monotone and is required so that an appropriate mixing condition for convergence independent of initial conditions obtains.
54 The change in surplus would be second order when V1 and V2 are varied according to the Pareto frontier at t starting from maximum
surplus; because the frontier’s slope is −mu(t) at maximum surplus, the change we construct also only has a second-order effect. Also,
note that, by construction, the self-enforcing constraints hold at t, and since V1(t−1) is unchanged and V2(t−1) is increased, they also
hold at t−1.
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FIGURE 2: Convergence to Pure Risk-Sharing
model converges to the risk-sharing one as hold-up disappears. One application of this is that it allows us to
characterise general properties of the hold-up dynamics for cases where hold-up is low.
From Ligon et al. (2002), the updating rule in the pure risk-sharing case, which we write mu(t) = hRS(mu(t−
1),st), has the property that there is a (possibly degenerate) interval [
¯
ρRSs , ρ¯RSs ] for each s such that hRS(mu(t−
1),s) = ρ¯RSs if mu(t−1)> ρ¯RSs ; hRS(mu(t−1),s) = mu(t−1) if mu(t−1) ∈ [
¯
ρRSs , ρ¯RSs ] and hRS(mu(t−1),s) =
¯
ρRSs if mu(t−1)<
¯
ρRSs . Moreover, there exists ¯
δ > 0 such that for 1≥ δ >
¯
δ , OCs that improve on autarky
exist, and each [
¯
ρRSs , ρ¯RSs ] is non-degenerate (Proposition 2(iv) in Ligon et al. 2002).
Likewise, in the hold-up model we can also use (mu(t−1),st) as the state variable. (By mu(t−1) = σ(t), this
is equivalent to (σ(t),st).) Thus the evolution of the contract can be represented by mu(t) = h(mu(t−1),st),
where h:R+∪{∞}×S → R+.55 The updating functions h(mu,s) converge to those of the pure risk-sharing
model as the hold-up problem diminishes. Moreover, for mu(t−1) within the interior of the interval [
¯
ρRSst , ρ¯
RS
st ],
when hold-up is small enough, optimal actions at t are at the first-best levels and so mu(t) = mu(t−1). An
ilustration of this convergence for two states is depicted in Figure 2.
55 See Lemma 18 in the Appendix for details and characterisation.
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PROPOSITION 1: For each state s ∈S , (i) for all mu ∈ R+, h(mu,s)→ hRS(mu,s) as θi j→ 0, i, j = 1,2,
i 6= j, all s. (ii) For δ >
¯
δ and any η satisfying (1/2)(ρ¯RSs −
¯
ρRSs )> η > 0, all s, there exists ε > 0 such that
for θ si j < ε , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, all s, h(mu,s) = mu for all mu ∈ [
¯
ρRSs +η , ρ¯RSs −η ].
One well-known feature of the pure risk sharing model is the “amnesia” property that once one of the agents
is constrained, then the previous history is irrelevant to the future evolution of the OC. This property no longer
applies in our model of risk averse agents with actions. Suppose that agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint binds
at date t. In the risk-sharing problem, this fixes his continuation utility and there is a unique optimal way
of delivering this continuation utility independently of past history and, in particular, independently of the
previous ratio of marginal utilities. This can be seen in the flat sections of the functions hRS(mu,s) in Figure 2.
In the hold-up problem, by contrast, agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint can be relaxed by cutting agent 1’s
action. Although this change may reduce surplus, sacrificing surplus can be offset by improved risk sharing
and the incentive to do this will vary with the lagged MU ratio. The logic of trading off surplus to improve risk
sharing is similar to the explanation given above for why the partial insurance case involves optimal actions that
are not CSM, even in the long run. This result is illustrated in Figure 2 by the fact that the functions h(mu,s)
are upward sloping even away from the 45◦ line (Lemma 18). Thus, even when an agent is constrained, past
history affects the current actions and consumption and the future evolution of the OC. The amnesia property
fails.
6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamic properties of a relational contract between two agents both of
whom undertake a costly investment or action that yields joint benefits. We have shown that optimal contracts
exhibit different properties depending on whether agents are risk neutral or risk averse. In the risk-neutral case,
investments may be either above or below the efficient level and that actions and the division of the surplus
converges monotonically to a stationary solution at which actions are constrained surplus maximizing (either
both are first-best or both are below the first-best level). In the risk-averse case, we also establish a convergence
result but convergence may or may not be monotonic depending on whether it is possible to sustain a first-best
allocation or not. We have demonstrated that the optimal contract converges to the pure-risk sharing results of
Kocherlakota (1996) as our hold-up problem vanishes.
In the risk averse case there is an interesting trade-off between hold-up and risk-sharing. The hold-up
problem creates an opportunity to relax the default constraint by lowering actions. This in turn allows more
risk-sharing to be achieved without leading to default. It would be interesting to evaluate whether the gain in
risk-sharing would ever be sufficient to offset the loss in surplus created by the original hold-up problem. This
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is a difficult question because without additional structure to the model little can be said about the long run
distribution of the optimal contract.
The model might be extended in a number of directions. One extension would be to consider a model of
repeated voluntary contributions to public good provision. Other extensions could allow for heterogeneous
discount rates or to treat the actions as real investments with capital accumulation such as in a model of
sovereign debt, or to consider efficient ownership structures when ownership affects the breakdown utilities.
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APPENDIX
Statements of Lemmas for Section 2
LEMMA 1: Under Assumption 2, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and for each s ∈S , the conditionally efficient action,
a∗i (a j,s), is single-valued, weakly increasing and continuous in a j.
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LEMMA 2: Under Assumption 3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and for each s ∈S , the Nash best-response, aNi (a j,s),
is single-valued, weakly increasing and continuous in a j. Moreover, 0< aNi (a j,s)< a
∗
i (a j,s) for all a j.
LEMMA 3: Under Assumptions 1 and 3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and for each s∈S , the deviation utility, Dsi (a j),
is bounded below and is a continuous, increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable function of a j.
Statements of Lemmas for Section 3
LEMMA 4: Under Assumptions1-3, the set of lifetime utilities Vs0 that correspond to DRCs is compact for
each s0 ∈S . Hence, optimal contracts exist.
LEMMA 5: Under Assumptions 1-3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, optimal actions satisfy ai(st)≥ aNi (a j(st),st), and
(a1(st),a2(st))≥ aNE(st)> 0, for any history st .
LEMMA 6: Under Assumptions 1-3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, if for any history st , ci(st) = yst (a1(st),a2(st)),
aNi (a j(s
t),st)≤ ai(st)≤ a∗i (a j(st),st) and Vi((st ,r))≥ Dri (aNEj (r)) for all r ∈S , then
ui(yst (a1(st),a2(st))−ai(st))+δ ∑
r∈S
pist rVi((s
t ,r))> Dsti (a j(s
t)).
LEMMA 7: For each s ∈S and under Assumptions 1-3 (i) under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5,
V s2 (V1) is a continuous and concave function of V1 defined on a closed interval [¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ]. (ii) Under Assumption 4,
V s2 (V1) is strictly concave over any interval such that d
s(V1) varies with V1; under Assumption 5, V s2 (V1) is
strictly concave over any interval such that ds(V1) varies with V1, or if ui is strictly concave, i = 1,2.
LEMMA 8: Under Assumptions 1-3 and under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, the Pareto-frontier
V s2 (V1) is continuously differentiable on (¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ), where ¯
V s1 < V¯
s
1 for each s ∈S . Moreover,
V s(+)2 (¯
V1) = 0 and V
s(−)
2 (V¯1) =−∞,
where V s(+)2 denotes the right and V
s(−)
2 the left derivative.
LEMMA 9: Under Assumptions 1-3 and under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, dsi (V1) is a continuous
function of V1 for each s ∈S and i = 1,2.
LEMMA 10: Under Assumptions 1-3, and for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, for any history st , (i) if Vi(st)> d j(st), then
a j(st)≥ a∗j(ai(st),st); (ii) if ci(st)> 0, then ai(st)≤ a∗i (a j(st),st).
Statement of Lemmas and Proofs of Main Results for Section 4
For this subsection we maintain Assumptions 1-4 but additionally assume that agents are risk-neutral with
ui(xi) = xi.
LEMMA 11: For each s ∈ S , the Pareto-frontier V s2 (·) is strictly concave on [¯V
s
1 , ¯
V s∗1 ) where ¯
V s∗1 :=
inf{V1:V s′2 (V1) = −1}, and on (V¯ s∗1 ,V¯ s1 ] where V¯ s∗1 := sup{V1:V s′2 (V1) = −1}. If first-best actions are not
sustainable in state s, i.e., for s ∈S c∗ , then V s2 (·) is strictly concave on [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ].
LEMMA 12: With probability one, there is a random time tˆ < ∞ such that ζ (t) converges monotonically to 0
with ζ (t) = 0 for all t ≥ tˆ−1.
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LEMMA 13: For each s ∈S , the surplus function zs(V1) is a continuous and single peaked function of
V1. That is, for any V
(1)
1 <V
(2)
1 <V
(3)
1 , it is not possible that z
s(V (1)1 ),z
s(V (3)1 )> z
s(V (2)1 ). Moreover, z
s(V1) is
maximal when σs(V1) = 1.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Stationary phase: Define tˆ as the earliest date at which σ(t) = 1. By Lemma 12, tˆ < ∞ with probability 1. If
σ = 1 and V1 ∈ A (so that c1 = 0), then it follows from the first-order conditions that γ1 = γ2 = µ1 = µ2 = 0, and
hence that d = d∗. A similar argument applies for σ = 1 and V1 ∈C. If σ = 1 and V1 ∈ B (so c1 > 0 and c2 > 0),
then µ1 = µ2 from (4a). Thus, either µi = 0, i = 1,2, in which case again d = d∗ and zs(d) is maximal, or µi > 0,
i = 1,2, so both self-enforcing constraints bind. In the latter case, (∂ zs/∂d2)/(∂ zs/∂d1) = 1 =−V s′2 (V1), from
(4a) and (4c). From the concavity of V s2 (V1) and z
s(d), this implies that zs(d) is maximized by choice of
d ∈D(s) and V1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ] subject to d2 ≤V1,d1 ≤V2(V1). Since these self-enforcing constraints must hold
for any DRC, it follows that at σ = 1, zs(d) is maximal across all DRCs whether the self-enforcing constraints
bind or not and optimal actions are CSM. Also in the case where µ1 = µ2 > 0, it follows from (4c) that
di(t)< d∗i (d j(t),st)≤ d∗i (st), j 6= i (the last inequality follows because d∗i (d j,s) is non-decreasing in d j). Since
ai and di are positively monotonically related through the function gsj and a = a
∗ if and only if d = d∗, the
statement in the Theorem follows.
Backloading phase: Suppose V1(s0) is such that σ0 < 1 (a symmetric argument applies if σ0 > 1). Then
σ(t)≤ σ+(t)≡ σ(t+1)≤ 1 and γ2(t) = 0.
We first establish the last part of the theorem. Consider t = tˆ−1, so that σ+(t) ≡ σ(t +1) = 1. Then
σ+(t)−σ(t)> 0 and from (4a), µ1(t)> 0. (4b) implies that γ1(t) = 0. So from (4c), ∂ zst/∂d1 ≥ 0, and thus,
d1(t)≤ d∗1(d2(t),st). Likewise in (4c), d2(t) < d∗2(d1(t),st). Together with d1(t)≤ d∗1(d2(t),st) this implies
d1(t)≤ d∗1(st) and d2(t)< d∗2(st); equivalently a1(t)≤ a∗1(st) and a2(t)< a∗2(st).
Next, suppose σ+(t) < 1, so that t < tˆ−1 and from (5a) γ1 > 0 (so c1 = 0 and V1(t) ∈ Ast ). Equation (5a)
implies that ∂ys(a1,a2)/∂a1 < 1, so that a1(t)> a∗1(a2(t),st). Again using (4c), ∂ zs(d1,d2)/∂d2 ≥ 0, so that
d2(t)≤ d∗2(d1(t),st) and hence a2(t)≤ a∗2(a1(t),st).
To establish the monotonicity of the marginal conditions, consider dates t and t ′ with tˆ ≥ t ′> t such that the same
state s occurs at date t and t ′. If σ+(t ′)< 1, then it follows from the monotonicity of the sequence established
in Lemma 12 that σ+(t) ≤ σ+(t ′) < 1. Hence, V1(t) ∈ Ast and V1(t ′) ∈ Ast′ . It follows directly from (5a)
that 1 > ∂ys(a(t ′))/∂a1 ≥ ∂ys(a(t))/∂a1. Now suppose, contrary to the assertion that ∂ys(a(t ′))/∂a2 >
∂ys(a(t))/∂a2 or equivalently ∂ zs(a(t ′))/∂a2 > ∂ zs(a(t))/∂a2. From (5a) and (5b) ∂ zs(d(t))/∂d2 = σ+(t)−
σ(t) ≥ 0, and hence ∂ zs(a(t))/∂a2 ≥ 0 and ∂ zs(a(t ′))/∂a2 > 0. Strict concavity of zs(a) requires that
∑2i=1((∂ zs(a(t ′)/∂ai)− (∂ zs(a(t)/∂ai))(ai(t ′)−ai(t))< 0 for a(t) 6= a(t ′). Then, since ∂ 2zs/∂a1∂a2 ≥ 0, it
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follows that a1(t)≥ a1(t ′) and a2(t)> a2(t ′). This however provides a contradiction. To see this, consider that
σ(t ′)≥ σ(t) and σ(t)< 1 imply, from Lemma 11, that V1(t ′)≥V1(t). Equally, because ∂ zs(a(t ′))/∂a2 > 0,
µ1(t ′)> 0, and hence, d2(t ′) = V1(t ′)≥V1(t)≥ d2(t). This implies a2(t ′)≥ a2(t), a contradiction. A similar
argument applies if σ+(t) < σ+(t ′) = 1 and , except that in this case we have γ1(t ′) = γ2(t ′) = 0 and thus,
from (4c), ∂ zs(a(t ′))/∂a1 ≥ 0 > ∂ zs(a(t))/∂a1 (the second inequality follows from the earlier argument
because σ+(t)< 1). Finally, Lemma 13 shows that zs(V1) is continuous and single-peaked and has a maximum
when σs(V1) = 1. From above, V1(t ′)≥V1(t) when σ(t)< 1. Hence, we conclude that that zs(a(t))≤ zs(a(t ′)).
Statement of Lemmas and Proofs of Main Results for Section 5
For all lemmas and proofs in this subsection, we maintain Assumptions 1-3 and 5. Additionally it is assumed
that agents are risk averse, that is, ui is strictly concave for i = 1,2.
LEMMA 14: For each s ∈S , a solution to [P1] has the property that zs(a1,a2) is maximised over a ∈ R2+
subject to V1 ≥ Ds1(a2) and V s2 (V1)≥ Ds2(a1).
LEMMA 15: For each s ∈S , the surplus function zs(V1) is continuous, concave and differentiable in V1.
LEMMA 16: For each s ∈S , (i) dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0 (< 0) implies µs1(V1)> 0 (µs2(V1)> 0); (ii) there are two
critical values χ¯s1 ∈ (¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ] and
¯
χs1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ), such that d
s
2(V1) = V1 for all V1 ≤ χ¯s1 and ds1(V1) = V s2 (V1) for
all V1 ≥
¯
χs1. Moreover, µ
s
1(V1) = 0 for V¯
s
1 >V1 ≥ χ¯s1 and µs2(V1) = 0 for ¯V
s
1 <V1 ≤
¯
χs1 (if such V1 exist). If the
efficient actions can be sustained in state s, then χ¯s1 ≤
¯
χs1. Otherwise, χ¯
s
1 >
¯
χs1, and surplus is maximized for a
unique value of V1 ∈ (
¯
χs1, χ¯
s
1) at which both constraints bind.
LEMMA 17: For each V1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ]
σ+s (V1)−σs(V1) = u′2
dzs(V1)
dV1
.
Proof of Theorems 2 and 3:
We proceed in several steps, first proving Theorem 3 and then specializing to prove Theorem 2.
Since σ+s (V1) depends only on the current slope σ and the current state s (recall V1 and σ are uniquely
related for a given state) the evolution of the contract can be represented as a stochastic recursion, i.e., σ(t+
1) = σ+st (σ
−1
st (σ)), which we write as σ(t+1) = h(σ(t),st), and where h:R+∪{∞}×S → R+; σ(0) = σ0
is the given initial value, corresponding to the initial state s0 and agent 1’s lifetime utility V1(s0). (This is the
same function as h defined in the text, given that mu(t) = σ(t+1).)
LEMMA 18: (i) The function h(σ ,s) is continuous and strictly increasing in σ ; (ii) for each state s, there is a
single, possibly degenerate, interval of fixed points [
¯
σ∗s , σ¯∗s ], ¯
σ∗s > 0, such that h(σ ,s) = σ for any σ ∈ [¯σ
∗
s , σ¯∗s ];
(iii) h(σ ,s)< σ for σ > σ¯∗s and h(σ ,s)> σ for σ < ¯
σ∗s .
DYNAMIC RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 33
Proof. Let xi(V1) = ci(V1)−g j(di(V1)) be the net consumption of agent i (dropping the state superscript) and
ρ(V1) := u′2(x2(V1))/u′1(x1(V1)). Then, h(σ ,s) = ρ(σ−1s (σ)).
We first prove part (i). From the concavity properties of [P1] under Assumption 5, the choice variables xi(V1)
are continuous, and hence, ρ(V1) is continuous in V1. From Lemma 8, the Pareto-Frontier is continuously
differentiable and hence, so too is its inverse. Thus, h(σ ,s) is continuous in σ .
Next, we turn to the monotonicity of h(σ ,s). First, we show that ρ(V1) is strictly increasing. Suppose,
to the contrary, that ρ(V1) ≤ ρ(V˜1) for some V1 > V˜1. It follows from ρ(V1) = −V r′2 (V1) and the concav-
ity of the frontier V r2 (V1) that V
r
1 (V1) ≤ V r1 (V˜1) for all r ∈ S . Also, since V˜1 < V1, we have u1(x1(V˜1)) +
δ ∑r∈S pisrV r1 (V˜1) < u1(x1(V1)) +δ ∑r∈S pisrV r1 (V1). Hence, x1(V˜1) < x1(V1). Likewise, since the frontier is
downward sloping, V2(V˜1)>V2(V1) and V r2 (V
r
1 (V˜1))≤V r2 (V r1 (V1)), and therefore, that x2(V˜1)> x2(V1). But
then u′2(x2(V˜1))/u
′
1(x1(V˜1)) < u
′
2(x2(V1))/u
′
1(x1(V1)) or ρ(V˜1) < ρ(V1), which is a contradiction. Thus, we
can conclude that ρ(V1) is strictly increasing in V1. Since the frontier V s2 (V1) is strictly decreasing in V1 and
σ =−V s′2 (V1), the result is proved.
To establish parts (ii) and (iii), from Lemma 16, for s ∈S∗, surplus is at the first-best level for V1 ∈ [χ¯s1,
¯
χs1].
Correspondingly, there is an interval of Pareto frontier slopes [
¯
σ∗s , σ¯∗s ] := [−V s′2 (χ¯s1),−V s′2 (
¯
χs1)]. For s ∈S c∗ ,
the corresponding interval is degenerate at a single point [
¯
σ∗s , σ¯∗s ] := [−V s′2 (χˆs1)] where χˆs1 = argmaxV1 zs(V1).
It follows from part (b) of Assumption 5 and equation (4b) (given γi = νri = 0 for i = 1,2) that σ+s (V1) is
positive and finite. Thus, 0<
¯
σ∗s ≤ σ¯∗s < ∞. Equation (6) therefore implies the following: If σs(V1) ∈ [¯σ
∗
s , σ¯∗s ],
then σ+s (V1) = σs(V1). If σs(V1)> σ¯∗s , then dzs(V1)/dV1 < 0 (given the concavity of zs(V1) by Lemma 15) and
hence, σ+s (V1)< σs(V1). Likewise, if σs(V1)< ¯
σ∗s , then dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0 and hence, σ+s (V1)> σs(V1).
Let s¯ be a state such that
¯
σ ∗¯s ≥ ¯σ
∗
s and ¯
s a state such that σ¯∗
¯
s ≤ σ¯∗s for all s ∈S .
LEMMA 19: An FBA is sustainable if and only if
¯
σ ∗¯s ≤ σ¯∗
¯
s andS∗ =S .
Proof. The “if” implication follows because there would exist an initial value σ0 ∈ [¯σ
∗¯
s , σ¯∗
¯
s ] such that σ0 ∈
[
¯
σ∗s , σ¯∗s ] for each state s. It therefore follows that starting from σ0, σ(t), and hence, the ratio of marginal
utilities, is kept constant at σ0 and since surplus is maximized for σ(t) ∈ [¯σ
∗
st , σ¯
∗
st ], actions are CSM and thus
first-best by S∗ =S in each state. “Only if” follows because by Lemma 18 even if first-best actions are
sustainable in every state,
¯
σ ∗¯s > σ¯∗
¯
s would imply that whenever st = s¯ and sτ = ¯
s (such t, τ exist with probability
one given irreducibility), then either (a) σ(t) ∈ [
¯
σ∗st , σ¯
∗
st ] and σ(τ) ∈ [¯σ
∗
sτ , σ¯
∗
sτ ] in which case σ(t)> σ(τ), and
the risk-sharing condition fails, or (b) either or both σ(t) /∈ [
¯
σ∗st , σ¯
∗
st ] and σ(τ) /∈ [¯σ
∗
sτ , σ¯
∗
sτ ], in which case surplus
is not maximized at at least one of the dates.
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Proof of Theorem 3.
Recalling that mu(t) = σ(t+1), an interval [
¯
σ∗s , σ¯∗s ] corresponds to an interval of MU ratios in state s and
converge of σ(t) is equivalent to converence of mu(t). Part (a) of the Theorem therefore follows straight-
forwardly from Lemmas 18 and 19. From Lemma 19
¯
σ ∗¯s ≤ σ¯∗
¯
s . Convergence is to ¯
σ ∗¯s if σ0 < ¯
σ ∗¯s , since
σ(t) = h(σ(t−1),st−1)≥ σ(t−1) by Lemma 18(iii) and so {σ(t)} is a nondecreasing sequence; it is bounded
above by
¯
σ ∗¯s given h continuous and increasing in σ and that h(σ ,s)≤ σ , all s, for σ ≥ ¯σ
∗¯
s , by Lemma 18(ii)
and (iii); with probability one σ(t) converges to
¯
σ ∗¯s given that h(σ , s¯)> σ for σ < ¯
σ ∗¯s and the irreducibility
of [pisr] and finiteness of states implies that state s¯ is recurrent. Likewise convergence (monotonic) is to σ¯∗
¯
s
if σ0 > σ¯∗
¯
s , and σ (t) is constant at σ0 if σ0 ∈ [¯σ
∗¯
s , σ¯∗
¯
s ]. If there exist multiple FBAs then ¯
σ ∗¯s < σ¯∗
¯
s , and the
limit depends on σ0 and hence on V1(s0). Since limt→∞σ(t) ∈ [¯σ
∗
s , σ¯∗s ] for all s, mu(t) convergence and by
continuity the limit actions are a∗(st), and x∗(st) is such that u′2(x
∗
2(s))/u
′
1(x
∗
1(s)) = limt→∞σ(t), all s.
For (b), if an FBA is not sustainable, then by Lemma 19 either
¯
σ ∗¯s = σ¯∗
¯
s and the CSM actions are below
first-best levels in at least one state, or
¯
σ ∗¯s > σ¯∗
¯
s . In the former case by Lemma 18, following the argument
in part (a), {σ(t)} is monotonic and converges with probability one to
¯
σ ∗¯s = σ¯∗
¯
s ∈ [¯σ
∗
s , σ¯∗s ] for all s, im-
plying that limiting actions are CSM in each state, establishing case (b)(i). Otherwise, part (b)(ii) obtains;
σ(t) ∈ [mins{h(0,s)},maxs{h(∞,s)}] for t ≥ 1. Irreducibility and finiteness of [pisr] implies ¯s and s¯ are recur-
rent, and
¯
σ ∗¯s > σ¯∗
¯
s implies that for any σ ≥ 0, either h(σ , s¯) > σ or h(σ ,¯s) < σ (or both). Thus, given h is
continuous in σ , weak convergence to a degenerate distribution is impossible. Next consider the sequence of
r.v.s {a(t)− a¯(st)}. Assume w.l.o.g. that state ¯s is uniquely defined. Consider an infinite history {s0,s1, . . .} in
which each state occurs infinitely often, which implies from the properties of h established in Lemma 18 that
there exists t ′ such that σ(t)≥ σ¯∗
¯
s for t ≥ t ′; note that the set of such histories has probability one. Suppose that
a(t)− a¯(st)→ 0, so that along the subsequence {st1 ,st2 ,st3 , . . .} where ti is the ith time ¯s occurs, a(ti)→ a¯(¯s)
as i→ ∞. Consider a t ≥ t ′ such that st = s¯. Then σ(t)≥ h(σ¯∗
¯
s , s¯)> σ¯∗
¯
s by h increasing in σ and h(σ , s¯)> σ
for σ <
¯
σ ∗¯s . If ti is the next time ¯
s occurs, σ(ti) ≥ min{h(σ¯∗
¯
s , s¯),mins 6=
¯
s σ¯∗s } > σ¯∗
¯
s . This implies that V1(ti)
is bounded above argmaxV1 z¯
s(V1), i.e., above σ−1s (σ¯∗
¯
s ), so a(ti) is bounded away from a¯(¯
s). Since st = s¯
infinitely often, this contradicts a(ti)→ a¯(¯s).
Next, fix any σc ∈ (σ¯∗
¯
s , ¯
σ ∗¯s ); clearly h(σc, s¯) > σc and h(σc,¯
s) < σc. Using piss > 0 all s, there exist t ≥ 1
such that
ε1 := P(σ(t)< σc| σ0 = (max
s
{h(∞,s)}))> 0 and ε2 := P(σ(t)> σc| σ0 = (min
s
{h(0,s)})> 0,(A.1)
since for ε1 (respectively ε2) consider a sufficient number of consecutive occurrences of ¯
s (respectively s¯).
This implies the “splitting condition” of Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2007; Chapter 3.5, p250) for the i.i.d.
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case, and the condition in Foss et al. (2014; Corollary 1) in the general Markov case. Thus, there is a unique
stationary distribution F˜ such that F(V (s0))t converges weakly to F˜ , as t→ ∞, for any initial condition.
Proof of Theorem 2.
The proof of convergence is as in the proof of Theorem 3 parts (a) and (b)(i). In this one state case the
monotonicity of the sequence {V1(t)} implies the monotonicity of zs(V1(t)) given the argument relating to
equation (6) in the text. Equally, if V1(t) is increasing, it follows from the constraints that a2(t) is increasing
and if V1(t) is decreasing, then a1(t) is increasing. For a state s ∈S∗, the action of the constrained agent is
conditionally efficient and therefore by complementarity of production, if V1(t) is strictly monotone, then both
actions are increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof is straightforward but tedious and details are provided in the Supplementary Materials.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
This Supplementary Material contains the omitted proofs of all the lemmas from the Appendix to the paper.
It also contains the statements of all these lemmas and provides the details of the proof of Proposition 1. This
Supplementary Material can be used without reference to the Appendix.
Proofs of Lemmas for Section 2
LEMMA 1: Under Assumption 2, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and for each s ∈S , the conditionally efficient action,
a∗i (a j,s), is single-valued, weakly increasing and continuous in a j.
Proof. By Assumption 2, holding a j fixed, ys(a1,a2) is strictly concave in ai. Thus, the conditionally
efficient actions are uniquely defined. From the continuity and differentiability assumptions, each a∗i (a j,s) is a
continuous function of a j. Complementarity in production implies that a∗i (a j,s) is weakly increasing in a j for
i, j = 1,2, i 6= j.
LEMMA 2: Under Assumption 3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and for each s ∈S , the Nash best-response, aNi (a j,s),
is single-valued, weakly increasing and continuous in a j. Moreover, 0< aNi (a j,s)< a
∗
i (a j,s) for all a j.
Proof. Since the lemma applies for any given state s, the notational dependence on s can be dropped. Unique-
ness of the aNi (a j) follows from Assumption 3 that φi(ai,a j) is strictly concave in its own action. Standard
results imply these are continuous and differentiable functions. Since, from Assumption 3, ∂φi(0,a j)/∂ai > 1,
it follows that aNi (a j)> 0. Moreover, from the inequality in (1), 1< ∂φi(0,a j)/∂ai < ∂y(0,a j)/∂ai, so that
a∗i (a j)> 0. Thus,
1 =
∂φi(aNi (a j),a j)
∂ai
=
∂y(a∗i (a j),a j)
∂ai
>
∂φi(a∗i (a j),a j)
∂ai
,
where the first two equalities hold from the first-order conditions for aNi (a j) and a
∗
i (a j) respectively, and the last
inequality follows from (1). It then follows from the strict concavity of φi in its own argument (Assumption 3),
that aNi (a j)< a
∗
i (a j).
LEMMA 3: Under Assumptions 1 and 3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j and for each s∈S , the deviation utility, Dsi (a j),
is bounded below and is a continuous, increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable function of a j.
Proof. Using Lemma 2 and the definition of the deviation utility establishes its continuity and differentiability.
The derivative satisfies:
Ds′1 (a2) = u
′
1(φ
s
1(a
N
1 (a2,s),a2)−aN1 (a2,s))
∂φ s1(a
N
1 (a2,s),a2)
∂a2
.
Thus, Ds1(a2) is strictly increasing in a2 by the hold-up assumption in Assumption 3. To show it is strictly
concave, let υN1 (a2,s) := maxa˜1 φ
s
1(a˜1,a2)− a˜1. Dropping the state notation, since nothing depends on it,
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consider two values a2 6= aˆ2 and the convex combination aλ2 = λa2 +(1−λ )aˆ2 for λ ∈ (0,1). Then,
υN1 (a
λ
2 ) = φ1(a
N
1 (a
λ
2 ),a
λ
2 )−aN1 (aλ2 )
≥ φ1(λaN1 (a2)+(1−λ )aN1 (aˆ2),aλ2 )−
(
λaN1 (a2)+(1−λ )aN1 (aˆ2)
)
> λ
(
φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)−aN1 (a2)
)
+(1−λ )(φ1(aN1 (aˆ2), aˆ2)−aN1 (aˆ2))
= λυN1 (a2)+(1−λ )υN1 (aˆ2),
where the first inequality follows from optimality and the second strict inequality from Assumption 3 that φ1(a)
is strictly concave. Since D1(a2) = u1(υN1 (a2)) + δ ∑r∈S pisrD
r
1(a
NE
2 (r)) and u1 is itself concave, it follows
that D1(a2) is strictly concave. From Assumption 3, υN1 (a2) ≥ υN1 (0) > 0. Therefore, from Assumption 1,
u1(υN1 (a2))>−∞. Likewise, Dr1(aNE2 (r))>−∞, and hence, D1(a2) is bounded below too. The same arguments
apply with agent indices reversed.
Proofs of Lemmas for Section 3
LEMMA 4: Under Assumptions1-3, the set of lifetime utilities Vs0 that correspond to DRCs is compact for
each s0 ∈S . Hence, optimal contracts exist.
Proof. By Lemma 3, Dsi (a j) is bounded below and by Assumption 2, zs(a) is bounded above for each s ∈S .
Together these facts imply that the future utility for agent i is bounded above. Therefore, in order to satisfy (2),
it follows that ui(xi(st)), and hence xi(st), is above some bound, say xˆi, at each st . By Assumption 2, the set of
actions A (s) = {(a1,a2) ∈ R2+ | zs(a)≥ xˆ1 + xˆ2} is compact. Therefore, the action-consumption pairs after
any history st can be restricted to a compact subset, say z(st) ⊂ R4. Hence, the product space ∏st z(st) is
sequentially compact in the product topology because it is a countable product of compact spaces. Associated
with any DRC (and for notational simplicity, ignoring the dependence on the initial state) is a pair of discounted
utilities (V1,V2). Let Γ denote the set of DRCs and V the set of associated discounted utilities. Consider any
convergent sequence in V and the associated sequence of DRCs in Γ. By sequential compactness, the latter has
a convergent sub-sequence that converges pointwise to some limiting contract. By the dominated convergence
theorem, the limit of the sequence of utilities at each st along the subsequence must satisfy the self-enforcing
constraints (2) because utilities are continuous functions of contracts in this topology when δ < 1, and because
the constraints are weak inequalities. Thus, the limit contract is a DRC, and the limiting sequence of the
associated lifetime utilities has a limit point that corresponds to the limit DRC. It follows that V is closed and
bounded, and hence, a compact subset of R2. The existence of optimal contracts then follows by maximizing
weighted sums (with non-negative weights) of utilities over this set.
LEMMA 5: Under Assumptions 1-3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, optimal actions satisfy ai(st)≥ aNi (a j(st),st), and
(a1(st),a2(st))≥ aNE(st)> 0, for any history st .
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Proof. We drop the state notation because nothing depends on it. We first note that aNE > 0 because, from
Lemma 2, aNi (a j) > 0 for all a j. The proof proceeds in two parts. The first is to show that one cannot
simultaneously have a2 < aN2 (a1) and a1 ≥ aN1 (a2) or vice-versa. Thus, the actions must be either above
both reaction functions or below both reaction functions. The next part shows that it is impossible to have
(a1,a2)≤ (aNE1 ,aNE2 ) with strict inequality for at least one agent. Since the reaction functions are non-decreasing
from Lemma 2, this rules out that both actions are below the reaction functions. Finally we show that aNE > 0.
Step 1: Suppose that at some date t, a2 < aN2 (a1) and a1 ≥ aN1 (a2). Then
∂φ2(a1,a2)
∂a2
>
∂φ2(a1,aN2 (a1))
∂a2
= 1(S.1)
since φ2 is strictly concave, and
∂φ1(a1,a2)
∂a2
≥ ∂φ1(a
N
1 (a2),a2)
∂a2
,(S.2)
by complementarity, given a1 ≥ aN1 (a2). Consider a small increase in a2 of ∆a2 > 0. The consequent increase
in output is approximately (∂y(a1,a2)/∂a2)∆a2. If the self-enforcing constraint of agent 1 is not binding, this
increase in output can be given to agent 2 without violating any constraints. Suppose then, that agent 1’s
self-enforcing constraint is binding. Change the contract by increasing agent 1’s consumption at date t,
so that her utility increases by the same amount as the increase in her deviation utility. From the envelope
theorem, the increase in the deviation utility is, to a first-order approximation, D′1(a2)∆a2 = u′1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)−
aN1 (a2))(∂φ1(a
N
1 (a2),a2)/∂a2)∆a2. The remainder of the extra output (we show this is positive below because
agent 2 will be better off) is given to agent 2. Keep the future unchanged. We now show that these changes
meet the constraints and lead to a Pareto-improvement, contrary to the assumed optimality of the contract.
Let wi denote the current utility of agent i. First, agent 1 is no worse off (in fact better off, given the hold-up
assumption) and by construction her self-enforcing constraint is satisfied. For agent 2, the change in current
utility is, to a first-order approximation,
∆w2 ' u′2(c2−a2)
(
∂y(a1,a2)
∂a2
− u
′
1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)−aN1 (a2))
u′1(c1−a1)
∂φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)
∂a2
−1
)
∆a2.(S.3)
Since agent 1’s self-enforcing constraint is binding, V1 = D1(a2) and therefore u1(c1−a1)+δ ∑r∈S pisrV r1 =
u1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)− aN1 (a2)) + δ ∑r∈S pisrDr1(aNE2 (r)). Also, since V r1 ≥ Dr1(aNE2 (r)), u1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)−
aN1 (a2)) ≥ u1(c1− a1). Therefore, it follows that u′1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)− aN1 (a2)) ≤ u′1(c1− a1). Using this,
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the fact that ∂y(a1,a2)/∂a2 ≥ ∑2i ∂φi(a1,a2)/∂a2, from Assumption 3, the inequality in (S.2) above, gives
∂y(a1,a2)
∂a2
− u
′
1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)−aN1 (a2))
u′1(c1−a1)
∂φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)
∂a2
≥ ∂y(a1,a2)
∂a2
− ∂φ1(a1,a2)
∂a2
≥ ∂φ2(a1,a2)
∂a2
.
Then using (S.1), the bracketed term in (S.3) satisfies:(
∂y(a1,a2)
∂a2
− u
′
1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)−aN1 (a2))
u′1(c1−a1)
∂φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)
∂a2
−1
)
> 0.
Thus, for ∆a2 small enough, ∆w2 > 0. Agent 2’s constraint is satisfied because a1, and hence also D2(a1) are
unchanged, while his utility has risen, so a Pareto-improvement has been demonstrated. A symmetric argument
applies when a1 < aN1 (a2) and a2 ≥ aN2 (a1).
Step 2: Suppose that (a1,a2)≤ (aNE1 ,aNE2 ) with strict inequality for at least one agent, say agent 2. Consider
replacing the actions with the Nash equilibrium actions aNEi , so that output rises from y(a1,a2) to y(a
NE
1 ,a
NE
2 ).
Let agent 1 have consumption of φ1(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 ) and give the remainder of the output to agent 2 (we shall
show that utility does not fall, so consumption does not fall, and thus, the change is feasible). The change in
per-period utilities are
∆w1 = u1(φ1(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )−aNE1 )−u1(c1−a1)
∆w2 = u2(y(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )−φ1(aNE1 ,aNE2 )−aNE2 )−u2(c2−a2)≥ u2(φ2(aNE1 ,aNE2 )−aNE2 )−u2(c2−a2).
(S.4)
By the definition of (aNE1 ,a
NE
2 ), Di(a
NE
j ) = ui(φi(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )− aNEi ) + δ ∑r∈S pisrDi(aNEj,r ,r) for i = 1,2, i 6= j.
Hence, for agent 1
D1(aNE2 )−D1(a2) = u1(φ1(aNE1 ,aNE2 )−aNE1 )−u1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2))−aN1 (a2))),(S.5)
with a similar expression for agent 2. Using the expression for ∆w1 in (S.4) and (S.5) gives,
∆w1− (D1(aNE2 )−D1(a2)) =
(
u1(φ1(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )−aNE1 )−u1(c1−a1)
)−(
u1(φ1(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )−aNE1 )−u1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2))−aN1 (a2)))
)
= u1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2))−aN1 (a2))−u1(c1−a1).
(S.6)
We can assume that V1 = D1(a2), otherwise it would be possible to raise a2 and reallocate output in a Pareto-
improving way. Thus, by the same arguments as in Step 1, u1(φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)− aN1 (a2)) ≥ u1(c1− a1), so
that ∆w1− (D1(aNE2 )−D1(a2)) ≥ 0: the change does not violate the self-enforcing constraint of agent 1.
Moreover, since aNE2 > a2 by assumption, and since Lemma 3 shows that D1(a2) is strictly increasing, it
follows from (S.6) that ∆w1 > 0. Now consider agent 2. The new consumption of agent 2 is equal to
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y(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )−φ1(aNE1 ,aNE2 ), which by Assumption 3 is at least φ2(aNE1 ,aNE2 ). Thus, the change in current utility
of agent 2 satisfies ∆w2 = u2(φ2(aNE1 ,a
NE
2 )−aNE1 )−u2(c2−a2) and the same argument as above can be applied
to show ∆w2− (D2(aNE1 )−D2(a1)) ≥ 0. Thus, we obtain a contradiction to the assumed optimality of the
original contract.
LEMMA 6: Under Assumptions 1-3, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, if for any history st , ci(st) = yst (a1(st),a2(st)),
aNi (a j(s
t),st)≤ ai(st)≤ a∗i (a j(st),st) and Vi((st ,r))≥ Dri (aNEj (r)) for all r ∈S , then
ui(yst (a1(st),a2(st))−ai(st))+δ ∑
r∈S
pist rVi((s
t ,r))> Dsti (a j(s
t)).
Proof. We drop the state notation for the current state because nothing depends on it. Suppose c1 =
y(a1,a2). From Lemma 5, optimal actions satisfy a1 ≥ aN1 (a2). Thus, aN1 (a2)≤ a1 ≤ a∗1(a2) and y(a1,a2)−
a1 ≥ y(aN1 (a2),a2)− aN1 (a2). Equally, by Assumption 3, aN1 (a2) > 0, so that y(aN1 (a2),a2)− aN1 (a2) >
φ1(aN1 (a2),a2)− aN1 (a2). Thus, u1(y(a1,a2)− a1) > uN1 (a2). Write V r1 for next-period continuation utility
in state r. Then,
D1(a2) := uN1 (a2)+δ∑
r
pisrDr1(a
NE
2 (r))
< u1(y(a1,a2)−a1)+δ∑
r
pisrV r1 ,
where the second inequality follows from u1(y(a1,a2)−a1)> uN1 (a2) and V r1 ≥ Dr1(aNE2 (r)).
LEMMA 7: For each s ∈S and under Assumptions 1-3 (i) under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5,
V s2 (V1) is a continuous and concave function of V1 defined on a closed interval [¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ]. (ii) Under Assumption 4,
V s2 (V1) is strictly concave over any interval such that d
s(V1) varies with V1; under Assumption 5, V s2 (V1) is
strictly concave over any interval such that ds(V1) varies with V1, or if ui is strictly concave, i = 1,2.
Proof. We first note that Assumption 4 implies that zs(d) is strictly concave. Since zs(d)+ gsj(di) is concave,
zs(dλ )−(λ zs(d)+(1−λ )zs(dˆ)≥ (λgsj(di)+(1−λ )gsj(dˆi))−gsj(dλi ) for pairs d and dˆ and dλ = λd +(1−λ )dˆ
and λ ∈ [0,1]. Since gsj(di) is strictly convex, (λgsj(di)+(1−λ )gsj(dˆi))−gsj(dλi )> 0 for λ ∈ (0,1) and di 6= dˆi
and i, j = 1,2, i 6= j. Hence, for d 6= dˆ and λ ∈ (0,1), we have zs(dλ )− (λ zs(d) + (1−λ )zs(dˆ) > 0, so that
zs(d) is strictly concave.
First consider Assumption 4. Let (x(st),d(st))∞t=0 and (x̂(s
t), d̂(st))∞t=0 be two OCs with utilities of (V1,V
s
2 (V1))
and (V̂1,V s2 (V̂1)) respectively, with V1 6= V̂1 (if there is a unique OC, i.e., a unique Pareto-efficient allocation,
then the lemma is trivial). Take a convex combination of the two contract actions, such that dλ (st) = λd(st)+
(1−λ )d̂(st) is chosen each period, 0< λ < 1. Define, for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j,
hstj (s
t) := gstj (d
λ
i (s
t))−
(
λgstj (di(s
t))+(1−λ )gstj (d̂i(st)
)
.
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Since gsj is convex, h
s
j ≤ 0. We want to show that it is feasible to choose x˜i(st) such that c˜i(st) ≡ x˜i (st)
+gstj (d
λ
i (s
t))≥ 0, x˜1(st)+ x˜2(st)≤ zs(dλ (st)), equivalently c˜1(st)+ c˜2(st)≤ ys(dλ (st)), and x˜i (st)≥ λxi(st)+
(1−λ )x̂i(st), equivalently c˜i(st)≥ (λci(st)+(1−λ )ĉi(st))+h j(st), i = 1,2 (where ci and ĉi are the consump-
tions corresponding to the original contracts). For notational convenience, we drop the dependence on the state
and history for the moment. Let c˜1 = max{λc1 +(1−λ )ĉ1 + h2,0} and c˜2 = y(dλ )− c˜1. There are two cases
to consider: case I, where λc1 +(1−λ )ĉ1 + h2 < 0, and case II, where λc1 +(1−λ )ĉ1 + h2 ≥ 0.
Case I. In this case, c˜1 = 0 and c˜2 = y(dλ ). Then, by assumption, c˜1 > λc1 + (1−λ )ĉ1 + h2. Furthermore,
c˜2 > 0 since actions, and hence, output is positive. Next c˜2− (λc2 +(1−λ )ĉ2 + h1)≥ y(dλ )− (λy(d)+(1−
λ )y(d̂)+h1)≥ 0, where the first inequality follows because c2 ≤ y(d) and ĉ2 ≤ y(d̂) and the second inequality
follows from Assumption 4 that z(d)+ g2(d1) (≡ y(d)−g1(d2)) is concave in d.
Case II. In this case, c˜1 = λc1 + (1−λ )ĉ1 + h2 and c˜2 = y(dλ )− c˜1. By assumption, c˜1 ≥ 0. Furthermore,
c˜2 = y(dλ )− c˜1 = y(dλ )− (λc1 +(1−λ )ĉ1 + h2)≥ y(dλ )− (λy(d)+(1−λ )y(d̂))−h2 ≥ 0, where the final
inequality follows because y(d)−g2(d1) (≡ z(d)+g1(d2)) is concave in d. Likewise, c˜2−(λc2 +(1−λ )ĉ2)−
h1 = y(dλ )− (λ (c1 + c2) + (1−λ )(ĉ1 + ĉ2))−h2−h1 ≥ z(dλ )− (λ z(d) + (1−λ )z(d̂) ≥ 0, where the first
inequality follows from c1 + c2 ≤ y(d) and ĉ1 + ĉ2 ≤ y(d̂). The final inequality follows from the concavity of
z(d), and is a strict inequality if d 6= d̂ because z is strictly concave.
Now consider the contract (x˜(st),dλ (st))∞t=0. We have, by the forgoing and by the concavity of ui, that:
ui(c˜i−g j(dλi ))≥ ui(λ (ci−g j(di))+(1−λ )(ĉi−g j(d̂i)))
≥ λui(ci−g j(di))+(1−λ )ui(ĉi−g j(d̂i)),
(S.7)
where for one of the agents the first inequality is strict if d 6= d̂ (agent 1 in case I, agent 2 in case II).
Thus, the contract (x˜(st),dλ (st))∞t=0 offers at least as much utility in each date-event pair as the average
contract and is feasible and self-enforcing. By construction, utilities from the new contract are at least
λ (V1,V s2 (V1)) + (1−λ )(V̂1,V s2 (V̂1)). Considering cases where d 6= d̂, the first claim of part (ii) follows by
straightforward arguments.
Under Assumption 5, it is only necessary to consider case II. Applying the same argument using the concavity
of z(d) shows that (x˜(st),dλ (st))∞t=0 offers at least as much utility in each date-event pair as the average contract
and is feasible and self-enforcing. For d 6= d̂ we again get a strict inequality because z is strictly concave; if ui
is strictly concave, then the second inequality in (S.7) is strict at some date, and hence, strict concavity of V2
follows.
Using standard arguments, it then follows that V s2 (·) is concave on an open interval (¯V1,V¯1) where ¯V1 and
V¯1 are the respective infimum and supremum of the projection of the Pareto frontier onto agent 1’s utilities.
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To show that V s2 (·) is in fact concave, continuous and defined on [¯V1,V¯1], consider a sequence {V
p
1 }∞p=1
∈ (
¯
V1,V¯1), such that V
p
1 ↓ ¯V1 (that is, from above). Since all variables belong to compact spaces, assume w.l.o.g.
that a corresponding subsequence of optimal contracts {(xpt ,dpt )t≥0)}∞p=1 is convergent. Since all inequality
constraints are weak, it is easily seen that this limit contract is self-enforcing. Therefore, an optimal contract
must offer at least the utility to agent 2 from the limit contract, V2(¯
V1)≥ limp→∞V2(V p1 ). Equally, it cannot
offer more because this would violate concavity of the value function (creating a discontinuity at
¯
V1). The fact
that V2(V1) is continuous and decreasing on (¯
V1,V¯1) then implies that V2(¯
V1)>V2(V1) for all V1 ∈ (¯V1,V¯1), and
hence, that this point at
¯
V1 is constrained Pareto efficient. A similar argument applies at V¯1.
LEMMA 8: Under Assumptions 1-3 and under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, the Pareto-frontier
V s2 (V1) is continuously differentiable on (¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ), where ¯
V s1 < V¯
s
1 for each s ∈S . Moreover,
V s(+)2 (¯
V1) = 0 and V
s(−)
2 (V¯1) =−∞,
where V s(+)2 denotes the right and V
s(−)
2 the left derivative.
Proof. Assume
¯
V s1 < V¯
s
1 (this is established later). Fix V1 = V
o
1 ∈ (¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ) and let the superscript “o” represent
optimal values of other variables (these need not be unique). Since nothing depends on it, the notational
dependence on the state s is dropped. Recall that by Lemma 5, output is positive. Hence there are three
possibilities: (A) co1 = 0 and c
o
2 > 0, (B) c
o
1 > 0 and c
o
2 > 0, or (C) c
o
1 > 0 and c
o
2 = 0 (only possibility B is relevant
under Assumption 5). First, consider case (B) and define ϒo1 := V
o
1 −do2 and ϒo2 := V o2 −do1 where ϒo1,ϒo2 ≥ 0 in
any DRC. Also V o2 = V2(V
o
1 ). Likewise, we have the recursive equations u1(c
o
1−g2(do1))+δ ∑r∈S pisrV ro1 = V 01
and u2(z(do1 ,d
o
2) + g2(d
o
1)− c01) + δ ∑r∈S pisrV ro2 = V o2 . Consider the following equations where the future
values, but not (necessarily) the current values, are at their optimal levels:
V1−u1(c1−g2(d1)) = δ ∑
r∈S
pisrV ro1 ,
V2−u2(z(d1,d2)+ g2(d1)− c1)) = δ ∑
r∈S
pisrV ro2 ,
V1−d2 = ϒo1,
V2−d1 = ϒo2.
Since the functions ui, gi and z are continuous and differentiable, the implicit function theorem asserts the
existence of continuous and differentiable functions c˜1(V1), d˜1(V1), d˜2(V1) and V˜2(V1) in an open interval
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around V o1 such that c˜1(V
o
1 ) = c
o
1 etc. and for each V1 in the interval
V1−u1(c˜1(V1)−g2(d˜1(V1))) = δ ∑
r∈S
pisrV ro1 ,
V˜2(V1)−u2(z(d˜1(V1), d˜2(V1))+ g2(d˜1(V1))− c˜1(V1)) = δ ∑
r∈S
pisrV ro2 ,
V1− d˜2(V1) = ϒo1,
V˜2(V1)− d˜1(V1) = ϒo2,
provided the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, J, of this system (all functions evaluated at the optimum V o1 )
satisfies:
|J|= u′1
(
1−u′2
∂ z
∂a1
g′2
)
6= 0.(S.8)
Given that u′1 > 0, the condition is equivalent to the linear independence constraint qualification, which holds
unless V1 = V¯ s1 .
We have V˜2(V o1 ) = V2(V
o
1 ) and V˜2(V1)≤V2(V1) because V2(V1) is an optimal value function. Since V2(V1)
is concave (Lemma 7, which does not depend on differentiability) and given V˜2(V1) is differentiable, and
V˜2(V o1 ) = V2(V
o
1 ) with V˜2(V1)≤V2(V1), Lemma 1 of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) can be applied, and
therefore, it follows that V2(V1) is differentiable at V o1 .
Next, consider case (A): co1 = 0 and c
o
2 > 0. We can proceed as before except that by Lemma 6, agent 2’s
self-enforcing constraint is not binding. Thus, V2 > d1, and this constraint can be ignored. Instead, hold c1 = 0
fixed. Therefore, consider small changes in the current contract (that is, varying a1,a2,V1,V2), which satisfy:
V1−u1(−gs2(d1)) = δ ∑
r∈S
pisrV ro1 ,
V2−u2(z(d1,d2)+ g2(d1))) = δ ∑
r∈S
pisrV ro2 ,
V1−d2 = ϒo1.
Here the implicit function theorem can be applied directly because the determinant of the Jacobian of the
system is u′1g
′
2 > 0. Again applying Lemma 1 of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) shows that the function
V2(V1) is differentiable at V1. A similar argument applies to case (C). In particular, it can be shown that V−12 (V2)
is differentiable at V2 = V2(V1). Since V−12 (·) is strictly decreasing, V2(·) is differentiable at V1. Since V2(V1) is
differentiable and is a concave function on [
¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ], it follows as a corollary to Theorem 24.1 in Rockafellar
(1997) that the function has a continuous derivative.
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Next we confirm that
¯
V s1 < V¯
s
1 . Suppose to the contrary that the frontier consists of a single point. We
establish a contradiction. For cases (A), (B) and (C) let |J| denote the determinant of the Jacobian of the
systems described above and let |J′| be the corresponding determinant of the Jacobian with the agent indices
swapped. If either |J| 6= 0 or |J′| 6= 0, then the existence of the differentiable subfunction V˜2(V1) establishes
that there are feasible points which offer one of the agents a higher utility, contradicting the hypothesis. Thus,
it can only be that case (B) applies and that |J|= |J′|= 0. Rewriting the term in brackets in (S.8), this implies
(1−u′j((∂ z)/(∂ai))g′j) = (u′j/D′j)((∂φ j/∂ai)+ 1− (∂y/∂ai)) = 0,(S.9)
i 6= j, i, j = 1,2. Since (u′j/D′j)> 0, this implies (∂y/∂ai)−1− (∂φ j/∂ai) = 0. Consider a small increase in
a1 of ∆. Suppose that of the increase in output, agent 2 receives the increase in her default, approximately
∆∂φ2/∂a1, while the remainder is allocated to agent 1. Given equation (S.9), the reamainder is approximately
∆∂y/∂a1−∆∂φ2/∂a1 = ∆. Since ∆ is agent 1’s extra effort cost, she suffers no more than a second-order
loss, while agent 2 has a first-order gain in utility of approximately u′2∆∂φ2/∂a1. When state s recurs, make
a corresponding increase in a2, and thereafter continue alternating between the two agents. Since δ > 0, for
∆ small enough, there is a first-order gain in discounted utilities for both agents, and the first-order increase
in deviation utilities is always more than matched by an increase in the constructed contract utilities. Thus,
an allocation which offers strictly more than the initial equilibrium can be supported as an equilibrium, again
giving a contradiction.
We now show that
V (+)2 (¯
V1) = 0 and V
(−)
2 (V¯1) =−∞.
Suppose to the contrary of the assertion that V (+)2 (¯
V1) < 0 (it cannot be positive by definition of it being a
Pareto frontier). By a previous argument, for every V1 ∈ [¯V1,V¯1] at which the implicit function theorem can be
applied, there is a continuously differentiable function V˜2(V1) which describes utilities to agent 2 from DRCs
which yield V1 to agent 1. Moreover, the theorem together with the optimality of the function V2(V1) imply that
there is an open neighborhood of V1 such that V2(V1 + ε)≥ V˜2(V1 + ε) for all ε ≥ 0. At V1 = ¯V1 this therefore
implies V˜ ′2(¯
V1)≤V (+)2 (¯V1)< 0. The implicit function theorem (which applies if V˜
′
2(V1) is finite) then implies
that there is an ε > 0 with V˜2(V1− ε)> V˜2(¯V1) = V2(¯V1) corresponding to a DRC. Consequently, the Pareto
frontier must extend below
¯
V1, which is a contradiction. A similar argument applies at V¯1.
LEMMA 9: Under Assumptions 1-3 and under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, dsi (V1) is a continuous
function of V1 for each s ∈S and i = 1,2.
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Proof. Again we suppress the notational dependence on the state s. To see the uniqueness of d as a function of
V1, suppose to the contrary that (x,d,(V r1 )r∈S ) and (x̂, d̂,(V̂
r
1 )r∈S ) are both optimal at V1 with d 6= d̂. Consider
the convex combinations dλ = λd +(1−λ )d̂ for some λ ∈ (0,1) and define c˜ and cases I and II as in the proof
of Lemma 7. In case I, agent 1 is strictly better off while agent 2 is no worse off; in case II, as d 6= d̂, agent 2 is
strictly better off while agent 1 is no worse off. As shown in Lemma 7, this change is feasible, and delivers a
payoff profile that is Pareto-superior to that at V1, contrary to the optimality of the two original contracts.
To establish continuity of di(V1), let {V p1 }∞p=1 be such that V p1 → V ∗1 . Since all variables belong to compact
spaces, assume w.l.o.g. that the corresponding sequence of optimal choices {(xp,dp,(V rp1 )r∈S )}∞p=1 is con-
vergent to (x¯, d¯,(V¯ r1 )r∈S ), and let (x
∗,d∗,(V r∗1 )r∈S ) be the optimal choices at V
∗
1 . Assume that d¯ 6= d∗; a
contradiction will be established. By continuity of all the constraints, (c¯, d¯,(V¯ r1 )r∈S ) is feasible for V
∗
1 , and
since V s2 (V1) is continuous (from Lemma 7), this choice attains the maximum, contradicting the uniqueness of
d as a function of V s1 .
LEMMA 10: Under Assumptions 1-3, and for i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, for any history st , (i) if Vi(st)> d j(st), then
a j(st)≥ a∗j(ai(st),st); (ii) if ci(st)> 0, then ai(st)≤ a∗i (a j(st),st).
Proof. Again we drop the state notation for the proof. Parts (i) and (ii) follow directly from the first-order
condition (4c). (i) If Vi > d j, then µi = 0 and therefore, from (4c), ∂ zs(a)/∂a j ≤ 0. Thus, a j ≥ a∗j(ai,s), that
is, there is no underinvestment. (ii) Equally, if ci > 0, then γi = 0 and therefore, from (4c), ∂ zs(a)/∂ai ≥ 0.
Thus, ai ≤ a∗i (a j,s), that is, there is no overinvestment.
Proofs of Lemmas for Section 4
For this subsection we maintain Assumptions 1-4 but additionally assume that agents are risk-neutral with
ui(xi) = xi.
LEMMA 11: For each s ∈ S , the Pareto-frontier V s2 (·) is strictly concave on [¯V
s
1 , ¯
V s∗1 ) where ¯
V s∗1 :=
inf{V1:V s′2 (V1) = −1}, and on (V¯ s∗1 ,V¯ s1 ] where V¯ s∗1 := sup{V1:V s′2 (V1) = −1}. If first-best actions are not
sustainable in state s, i.e, for s ∈S ∗c , then V s2 (·) is strictly concave on [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ].
Proof. It follows from Lemma 7 that the Pareto-frontier is strictly concave provided that for any two values
V1 and V̂1, V1 6= V̂1, such that the corresponding choices satisfy d 6= d̂. If d(V1) 6= d∗, then one or other of the
self-enforcing constraints is binding, Therefore, taking a neighborhood about V1 shows that d cannot be constant
on this neighborhood, and hence, that the frontier is strictly concave (on the neighborhood). If, however,
d(V1) = d∗, then the actions are first-best, implying µi = γi = 0. Thus, from the first-order condition (4b) with
u′i = 1, it follows that V
′
2(V1) = −1. By concavity, the set of values of V1 where V ′2(V1) = −1 is an interval
(possibly degenerate). Since V s(+)2 (¯
V1) = 0 and V
s(−)
2 (V¯1) =−∞, this interval is contained in the interior of
[
¯
V1,V¯1].
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LEMMA 12: With probability one, there is a random time tˆ < ∞ such that ζ (t) converges monotonically to 0
with ζ (t) = 0 for all t ≥ tˆ−1.
Proof. Recall the three subsets of Λs = [
¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ]⊂R++: As = {V1 ∈Λs:co1 = 0}, Bs = {V1 ∈Λs:co1 > 0 and co2 >
0} and Cs = {V1 ∈ Λs:co2 = 0} where (co1,co2) represents an optimal value for consumption at V1. For notational
convenience, we drop the state superscripts and define σ(t+1) := σ+(t). Recall that ζ (t) = max{ζ1(t),ζ2(t)}
and that from the first-order conditions ζ1(t) = − ln(σ(t + 1)) and ζ2(t) = ln(σ(t + 1)). First, if σ(t) = 1,
then σ(t+1) = 1. Using (4b), this is immediate if V1 ∈ B. It also follows that σ(t+1) = 1 for V1 ∈ A or
V1 ∈ C because, for V1 ∈ A, 1 ≥ σ+ ≥ σ and for V1 ∈ C, 1 ≤ σ+ ≤ σ . Next, suppose w.l.o.g. that σ0 < 1.
Since σ ≥ 1 for V1 ∈C, it follows that V1 ∈ A or V1 ∈ B. For V1 ∈ B, σ(1) = 1, and for V1 ∈ A, 1≥ σ+ ≥ σ .
Hence, 1≥ σ(t+1)≥ σ(t). Thus, ζ (t) declines for all σ0. It remains to establish that convergence to σ(t) = 1
occurs. Let t ′ be the random period when c1 > 0 first occurs. We first show that t ′ < ∞ almost surely. Notice
that by virtue of a1 ≥ aNE1 (s) > 0 for any state s, when c1 = 0, agent 1’s utility is at most −aNE1 (s). Let
−
¯
a1 := maxs∈S {−aNE1 (s)} < 0. Since net utilities are bounded in equilibrium, denote by u¯1 the maximum
utility to agent 1 in any state. Let τ be such that δ τ u¯1/(1−δ )< ¯a1. Then, starting in any state s at any date
t, it must be the case that c1 > 0 on some some positive probability path within the next τ periods because
otherwise future utility after t + τ cannot compensate the current negative utility. Letting
¯
pi be the minimum
probability of any such τ-period path (that is, the minimum probability of a positive probability path), we
conclude that after history st , there is a probability of at least
¯
pi > 0 that c1 > 0 before t + τ . Consequently,
Pr[∃ t such thatc1(t)> 0 ] = 1. From the above argument, we have σ(t)≤ 1, but if c1(t)> 0 at t, then V1 ∈ B
or V1 ∈C. If V1 ∈ B, then σ(t+1) = 1; if V1 ∈C, then σ(t)≥ 1, and hence, combining inequalities, σ(t) = 1.
Hence, Pr[∃ t such thatζ (t) = 0 ] = 1.
LEMMA 13: For each s ∈S , the surplus function zs(V1) is a continuous and single peaked function of
V1. That is, for any V
(1)
1 <V
(2)
1 <V
(3)
1 , it is not possible that z
s(V (1)1 ),z
s(V (3)1 )> z
s(V (2)1 ). Moreover, z
s(V1) is
maximal when σs(V1) = 1.
Proof. Continuity follows from Lemma 9. Suppose, to the contrary, that zs(V1) is not single peaked and that
there is V (1)1 <V
(2)
1 <V
(3)
1 such that z
s(V (1)1 )> z
s(V (2)1 ) and z
s(V (3)1 )> z
s(V (2)1 ). By concavity of the Pareto-
frontier, there is some λ ∈ (0,1) such that the convex combination of contracts satisfies V (λ )1 = λV (1)1 +(1−
λ )V (3)1 ≤V (2)1 and V (λ )2 = λV s2 (V (1)1 )+(1−λ )V s2 (V (3)1 )≤V s2 (V (2)1 ). Let d(k)i and c(k)i denote the optimal choices
at V (k)1 for k = 1,2,3. In addition, let d
(λ )
i = λd
(1)
i + (1−λ )d(3)i . Lemma 7 shows that under Assumption 4
surplus is a concave function. Hence, zs(d(λ )1 ,d
(λ )
2 )≥ λ zs(d(1)1 ,d(1)2 )+(1−λ )zs(d(3)1 ,d(3)2 ) = λ zs(V (1)1 )+(1−
λ )zs(V (3)1 )≥min(zs(V (1)1 ),zs(V (3)1 ))> zs(V (2)1 ). Now consider the contract at V (2)1 and replace d(2)i by d(λ )i , and
replace c(2)i by c˜i, such that c˜i−gsj(d(λ )i ) > c(2)i −gsj(d(2)i ) and c˜1 + c˜2−gs2(d(λ )1 )−gs1(d(λ )2 ) = zs(d(λ )1 ,d(λ )2 ).
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The existence of such c˜i is guaranteed by the strict inequality just established that zs(d
(λ )
1 ,d
(λ )
2 )> z
s(d(2)1 ,d
(2)
2 ).
While making these changes to current utilities, keep continuation utilities unchanged. The new utilities satisfy
Vi > V
(2)
i ≥ V (λ )i ≥ d(λ )j , where the first inequality follows from the construction of the new contract, the
second inequality follows from the concavity of the frontier and the choice of λ , and the third follows from
the definitions of V (λ )i and d
(λ )
J and the constraints V
(k)
i ≥ d(k)j . This provides a contradiction, and hence, we
conclude that z(V1) is single peaked.
Consider σs(V1) = 1. If V1 ∈ As or V1 ∈Cs, then it follows from the first-order conditions that actions and
surplus are first-best. For V1 ∈ Bs, there are two possibilities: either µ1 = µ2 = 0, or µ1,µ2 > 0. In the former
case, actions and surplus are first-best. In the latter case, note that the first-order conditions can be used to
show µ1 = (∂ zs/∂d2)/(1− (∂ zs/∂d1)) and µ2 = (∂ zs/∂d1)/(1− (∂ zs/∂d1)). It has already been shown in
Lemma 8 that (1−(∂ zs/∂d1)) 6= 0 except possibly where V1 = V¯ s1 . Hence, from Lemma 9 and the continuity of
the functions zs (and gsi ), the multipliers are continuous functions of V1 and µ1,µ2 > 0 in an open neighborhood
of V1. Thus, in this neighborhood, d2(V1) = V1 and d1(V1) = V s2 (V1). Since V2(·) is a differentiable function, di
is a differentiable function of V1 in this neighborhood, with derivatives dd2/dV1 = 1 and dd1/dV1 =−σs(V1).
Hence,
dzs(V1)
dV1
=−σs(V1)∂ z
s(d1,d2)
∂d1
+
∂ zs(d1,d2)
∂d2
.
It can also be checked from the first-order conditions that the derivative dzs(V1)/dV1 is zero when σs(V1) = 1.
Moreover, it can be seen that zs(V1) is concave in this neighborhood, and hence, the surplus is maximal.
Proofs of Lemmas for Section 5
For all proofs in this subsection, we maintain Assumptions 1-3 and 5. Additionally it is assumed that agents
are risk averse, that is, ui is strictly concave for i = 1,2.
LEMMA 14: For each s ∈S , a solution to [P1] has the property that zs(a1,a2) is maximised over a ∈ R2+
subject to V1 ≥ Ds1(a2) and V s2 (V1)≥ D2(a1).
Proof. We work in terms of the variables d rather than directly in terms of the actions a and show that zs(d1,d2)
is maximised subject to V1 ≥ d2 and V s2 (V1)≥ d1. Suppose otherwise, and replace (d1(V1),d2(V1)) by some
(d1,d2) ∈D(s) satisfying these constraints with zs(d1,d2)> zs(d1(V1),d2(V1)). In doing so, hold c1−gs2(d1)
and (V r1 )r∈S constant. With these changes, all constraints are satisfied, but the maximand is increased, leading
to a contradiction.
LEMMA 15: For each s ∈S , the surplus function zs(V1) is continuous, concave and differentiable in V1.
Proof. Taking each property in turn.
Continuity: Continuity follows straightforwardly from the Theorem of the Maximum.
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Concavity: Take any V1 and V ′1 in [¯
V s1 ,V¯
s
1 ] and the convex combination V
λ
1 = λV1 + (1−λ )V ′1, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Let dλi := λdi(V1) + (1−λ )di(V ′1). Since Vi ≥ d j(V1) and V ′i ≥ d j(V ′1), it follows that V λ1 ≥ dλ2 . Similarly,
V s2 (V
λ
1 ) ≥ dλ1 , from the concavity of V s2 (V1). Consequently, (dλ1 ,dλ2 ) is feasible at V λ1 , and therefore, by
Lemma 14 and the concavity of zs(d1,d2), zs(d1(V λ1 ),d2(V
λ
1 )) ≥ zs(dλ1 ,dλ2 ) ≥ λ zs(d1(V1),d2(V1)) + (1−
λ )zs(d1(V ′1),d2(V ′1)). Thus, the concavity of zs(V1) is established.
Differentiability: To establish differentiability fix Vˆ1 ∈ (¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ) with optimal choices d1(Vˆ1) and d2(Vˆ1), and
consider a V1 in a neighborhood of Vˆ1 (⊂ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ]). Consider (d˜1(V1), d˜2(V1)) satisfying d˜2(V1)− d2(Vˆ1) =
V1− Vˆ1 and d˜1(V1)− d1(Vˆ1) = V s2 (V1)−V s2 (Vˆ1). By construction, (d˜1(V1), d˜2(V1)) is feasible, and by the
differentiability of V s2 (V1) and z
s(d1,d2), this traces out a differentiable function for V1, zs(d˜1(V1), d˜2(V1)) in
the neighbourhood of Vˆ1, with zs(d˜1(Vˆ1), d˜2(Vˆ1)) = zs(Vˆ1). From Part A, zs(d˜1(V1), d˜2(V1))≤ zs(V1). Therefore,
applying Lemma 1 of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) establishes differentiability.
LEMMA 16: For each s ∈S (i) dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0 (< 0) implies µs1(V1)> 0 (µs2(V1)> 0); (ii) there are two
critical values χ¯s1 ∈ (¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ] and
¯
χs1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ), such that d
s
2(V1) = V1 for all V1 ≤ χ¯s1 and ds1(V1) = V s2 (V1) for
all V1 ≥
¯
χs1. Moreover, µ
s
1(V1) = 0 for V¯
s
1 >V1 ≥ χ¯s1 and µs2(V1) = 0 for ¯V
s
1 <V1 ≤
¯
χs1 (if such V1 exist). If the
efficient actions can be sustained in state s, then χ¯s1 ≤
¯
χs1. Otherwise, χ¯
s
1 >
¯
χs1, and surplus is maximized for a
unique value of V1 ∈ (
¯
χs1, χ¯
s
1) at which both constraints bind.
Proof. Since nothing depends on it, we drop the state superscript in what follows. Result (i) follows immediately
from (6) (which follows from the first-order conditions) and the the first-order condition (4a) (setting νri = 0
for i = 1,2).
To prove result (ii), let the surplus function be at a maximum between
¯
V ∗1 and V¯
∗
1 (with a unique maximum if
¯
V ∗1 = V¯
∗
1 ). There are two possibilities: case (a), ¯
V ∗1 < V¯
∗
1 , and case (b), ¯
V ∗1 = V¯
∗
1 =: χˆ1. In case (a), it follows
from (i) that µ1(V1) > 0 for V1 < ¯
V ∗1 , and hence, d1(V1) = V2(V1) for V1 ≤ ¯V
∗
1 , where the weak inequality
follows by continuity of d1(V1) and V2(V1). Likewise, µ2(V1)> 0 for V1 > V¯ ∗1 , and d2(V1) = V1 for V1 ≥ V¯ ∗1 .
Since z(d) is strictly concave, and z(V1) is constant on [¯
V ∗1 ,V¯
∗
1 ], it follows (see proof of Lemma 13) that
actions are first-best and µ1(V1) = µ2(V1) = 0 on this interval. Next, consider some Vˆ1 < ¯
V ∗1 . We want
to show that µ2(Vˆ1) = 0. Suppose to the contrary that µ2(Vˆ1) > 0. Then, setting γi = 0, i = 1,2 in the
first-order condition (4c) shows that ∂ z(d1(Vˆ1),d2(Vˆ1))/∂d1 > 0 and d1(Vˆ1) = V2(Vˆ1) > V2(¯
V ∗1 ) ≥ d1(¯V
∗
1 ),
where the strict inequality follows because V2(·) decreasing. Since µ2(¯V
∗
1 ) = 0 (by efficiency), it follows
that ∂ z(d1(¯
V ∗1 ),d2(¯
V ∗1 ))/∂d1 = 0. Since d1(Vˆ1) > d1(¯
V ∗1 ), and because by assumption ∂ 2z/∂d21 < 0 and
∂ 2z/∂d1∂d2 ≥ 0, it follows that d2(Vˆ1)> d2(¯V
∗
1 ). But µ1(V1)> 0 for V1 < ¯
V ∗1 by the first part of the proof, so
that d2(Vˆ1) = Vˆ1 < ¯
V ∗1 = d2(¯
V ∗1 ) (where the last equality follows by continuity), yielding a contradiction. A
similar argument shows that µ1(V1) = 0 for V1 ≥ V¯ ∗1 .
For case (b), define V˜ µ21 ∈ [¯V1, χˆ1] to be the largest (supremum) value of V1 with µ2(V1) = 0 (recall µ2(V1)> 0
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for V1 > χˆ1 by part (i)). First, suppose such a value exists. Noting that µ1(V1)> 0 for V1 < χˆ1, for Vˆ1 <V
µ2
1 ,
replace
¯
V ∗1 by V˜
µ2
1 in the argument given in case (a), to show that µ2(Vˆ1) = 0 for Vˆ1 < V
µ2
1 . A symmetric
argument can be used to show µ1(Vˆ ) = 0 for all Vˆ > V˜
µ1
1 , if there exists a V˜
µ1
1 ∈ [χˆ1,V¯1] such that µ1(V˜ µ11 ) = 0.
then µ1(Vˆ ) = 0 for all Vˆ > V˜
µ1
1 . Therefore, set
¯
χ1 = V˜
µ2
1 and χ¯1 = V˜
µ1
1 . Note also, that if χ¯
s
1 =
¯
χs1 (= χˆ1),
then µ1(χˆ1) = µ2(χˆ1) = 0, by continuity of the multipliers in V1 (setting γi = 0, i = 1,2 in equation (4c) and
modifying the argument in Lemma 13), then actions are first-best at χˆ1. Finally, if there is no V˜
µ2
1 ∈ [¯V1, χˆ1]
to be the largest (supremum) value of V1 with µ2(V1) = 0, then set
¯
χ1 = ¯
V1. In this case, µ2(¯
V1)> 0 and both
actions are under-efficient at
¯
V1. Likewise, if there is no V˜
µ1
1 such that µ1(V˜
µ1
1 ) = 0, then χ¯1 = V¯1, µ1(V¯1)> 0
and both actions are under-efficient at V1 = V¯1.
LEMMA 17: For each V1 ∈ [¯V
s
1 ,V¯
s
1 ]
σ+s (V1)−σs(V1) = u′2
dzs(V1)
dV1
.
Proof. Setting νri = 0 for i = 1,2 in equation (4a), and also setting γi = 0 for i = 1,2 in equation (4b), and
substituting gives:
σ+s (V1)−σs(V1) = u′2
(
−σs(V1)∂ z
s(ds1(V1),d
s
2(V1))
∂d1
+
∂ zs(ds1(V1),d
s
2(V1))
∂d2
)
.(S.10)
The bracketed term on the right-hand-side of equation (S.10) is equal to dzs(V1)/dV1. To see this recall
that ∂ zs/∂di ≥ 0 and first note that if ∂ zs/∂d1 > 0, then µ2 > 0 and (3c) holds as an equality. Therefore,
ds1(V1) = V
s
2 (V1) and consequently dd
s
1/dV1 = V
s′
2 (V1) = −σs(V1) < 0. Hence, −σs(V1)(∂ zs/∂d1) equals
(∂ zs/∂d1)(dds1/dV1), with the same equality trivially holding if ∂ z
s/∂d1 = 0. Likewise, if ∂ zs/∂d2 > 0,
then (3b) holds an equality and dds2/dV1 = 1, and hence, (∂ z
s/∂d2) = (dds2/dV1)(∂ z
s/∂d2) (again, also
holding trivially if ∂ zs/∂d2 = 0). From Lemma 15, the surplus function is differentiable and therefore, using
the total derivative of zs(ds1(V1),d
s
2(V1)) with respect to V1, it follows that bracketed term in equation (S.10) is
equal to dzs(V1)/dV1. Hence, equation (S.10) can be written as
σ+s (V1)−σs(V1) = u′2
dzs(V1)
dV1
,
which is equation (6) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1 in Section 5
PROPOSITION 2: For each state s ∈S , (i) for all mu ∈ R+, h(mu,s)→ hRS(mu,s) as θi j→ 0, i, j = 1,2,
i 6= j, all s. (ii) For δ >
¯
δ and any η satisfying (1/2)(ρ¯RSs −
¯
ρRSs )> η > 0, all s, there exists ε > 0 such that
for θ si j < ε , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, all s, h(mu,s) = mu for all mu ∈ [
¯
ρRSs +η , ρ¯RSs −η ].
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Proof. To nest the hold-up and risk-sharing models consider the following problem:
[P2] max
(a(st)≥0,x(st)≥
¯
x)∞t=0
E
[
∑∞t=0 δ tu2(x2(st)) | s0
]
subject to
E
[
∑∞t=0 δ tu1(x1(st)) | s0
]
≥V1(s0)(S.11a)
ui(xi(st))+E
[
∑∞τ=t+1 δ τ−tui(xi(sτ)) | st
]
≥ Fsi (a j(st),θ ,ξ ) i = 1,2 and ∀st(S.11b)
x1(st)+ x2(st)≤ zˆs(a(st)) ∀st .(S.11c)
For Fsi (a j,θ ,ξ ) = Dsi (a j;θ) (where the dependence of the deviation utility on the default parameters has been
made explicit) and zˆs(a) = zs(a) := f s1(a1) + f
s
2(a2)−a1−a2, the solution to this problem is the solution to
our hold-up problem (henceforth, the HU problem). Define Y si := f
s
i (a
∗
i (s))−a∗i (s), zˆs(a) = Y s1 +Y s2 and for
ξ ≥ 0,
Fsi (a j,θ ,ξ ) = ui(Y
s
i )+E
[
∑∞τ=1 δ τui(Y sτi ) | s0 = s
]
+ξ .
We call this the ξ -RS problem (it is independent of a). When ξ = 0, this is the standard risk-sharing problem.
Define θ ≡ (θ si j)i, j=1,2,s∈S with θ sii = 1 and for i 6= j, θ si j = 0, i = 1,2, all s ∈S , and denote this by θ 0.
There exists ξˆ (θ) > 0, ξˆ (θ)→ 0 as θ → θ 0, such that for all θ (θ si j ≥ 0, i, j = 1,2, and ∑2i=1 θ si j ≤ 1,
j = 1,2), all 0≤ a2 ≤ a∗2(s), all s ∈S ,
Ds1 (a2;θ) := maxa1
u1 (θ s12 f2 (a2)+θ
s
11 f
s
1 (a1)−a1)+
E
[
∑
τ≥t+1
δ τ−tu1
(
θ sτ12 f
sτ
2
(
aNE2 (sτ)
)
+ max
a1
(θ sτ11 f
sτ
1 (a1)−a1)
)
| st = s
]
≤ E
[
∑
τ≥t
δ τ−tu1 (Y sτ1 +θ
sτ
12 f
sτ
2 (a
∗
2)) | s
]
≤ E
[
∑
τ≥t
δ τ−tu1 (Y sτ1 ) | s
]
+ ξˆ (θ) ,
(S.12)
where the first inequality follows from aNE2 (s)≤ a∗2(s) and the fact that if agent 1 deviates, then he gets at most
θ s12 f
s
2(a
∗
2(s)) more consumption today than his autarkic income Y
s
1 , given that maxa1(θ
s
11 f
s
1(a1)−a1)≤Y s1 and
θ s12 f
s
2(a2) ≤ θ s12 f s2(a∗2); likewise in the future given that θ sτ12 f sτ2 (aNE2 ) ≤ θ sτ12 f sτ2 (a∗2). (That is, for any θ near
enough to θ 0, we can find a ξ also small such that adding it to autarkic utility in the risk-sharing problem
gives a deviation utility bigger than the deviation utility in the hold-up problem.) Likewise for agent 2. Define
[
¯
V RS1 ,V¯
RS
1 ] to be the projection of the Pareto frontier onto agent 1’s utilities in the RS case in some state s
(dropping the dependence on s for notational simplicity, and where possible in what follows). By Ligon
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et al. (2002), u′2(x
RS
2 (¯
V RS1 ))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (¯
V RS1 )) =
¯
ρRS, u′2(xRS2 (V¯
RS
1 ))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (V¯
RS
1 )) = ρ¯
RS. By the assumption that
δ >
¯
δ ,
¯
V RS1 < V¯
RS
1 , and there exists a continuous function
¯
ξ (V1):(¯
V RS1 ,V¯
RS
1 )→ R++, such that for ξ ≤
¯
ξ (V1),
the solution to the ξ -RS problem exists at V1 ∈ (¯V
RS
1 ,V¯
RS
1 ) (adapting the arguments in Thomas and Worrall
1988).
A. Fix V1 ∈ (¯V
RS
1 ,V¯
RS
1 ). Then, for θ close enough to θ
0 such that ξˆ (θ) ≤
¯
ξ (V1), {(x(st) = w(st),a(st))}t≥0
is feasible in the HU problem, where {w(t)}t≥0 solves the ξˆ (θ)-RS problem at V1 and a(t) = a∗(st), which
implies (see (S.11b)) at all st
u1(w1(st))+E
[
∑τ≥t+1 δ τ−tu1(w1(sτ)) | st
]
≥ E
[
∑τ≥t δ τ−tu1(Y sτ1 ) | st
]
+ ξˆ (θ)
≥ Dst1 (a2(st);θ) ,
where the second inequality follows from (S.12); and also (S.11c) holds trivially. Likewise for agent 2.
Thus, the constraints in the HU problem are satisfied. Denote by C(θ) a solution to the HU problem at V1
(when it exists) and by V˜2(C(θ)) the corresponding payoff to agent 2, and likewise by R(ξ ) and V˜2(R(ξ )) the
corresponding contract and values in the ξ -RS problem, with R(0) the optimal risk-sharing contract at V1. We
have just shown that for θ close enough to θ 0:
V˜2 (C (θ))≥ V˜2
(
R
(
ξˆ (θ)
))
.(S.13)
Let θ → θ 0. We assert that limC(θ) = limR(ξˆ (θ)) (= R(0)). Suppose otherwise, then we can find a sub-
sequence (recall from Lemma 4 that the space of contracts is compact in the usual product topology, and
payoffs are continuous in this topology) for which limC(θ) exists and limC(θ) 6= R(0). For this subsequence,
then, V˜2(limC(θ)) = limV˜2(C(θ)) ≥ limV˜2(R(ξˆ (θ))) = V˜2(limR(0)) (from (S.13)), but since limC(θ) sat-
isfies the RS constraints (zˆs(at) is maximal in the RS problem, so (S.11c) must hold) and offers agent 2 a
payoff at least that in the RS problem, this contradicts the uniqueness of the RS solution. Moreover, for
all θ such that ξˆ (θ) <
¯
ξ (V1), neither self-enforcing constraint binds and a(0) = a∗. To see this, recall
that for ξ ≤
¯
ξ (V1), the solution to the ξ -RS problem exists at V1, so that V1 ≥ E[∑t≥0 δ tu1(Y st1 ) | s0 = s] +
¯
ξ (V1) > E[∑t≥0 δ tu1(Y
st
1 ) | s0 = s] + ξˆ (θ) ≥ Ds01 (a2;θ) (the latter follows from (S.12)). Hence, agent 1’s
self-enforcing constraint does not bind, and this also holds for agent 2 because V˜2(C(θ)) ≥ V˜2(R(ξˆ (θ))) >
E[∑t≥0 δ tu2(Y
st
2 ) | s0] + ξˆ (θ)≥ Ds02 (a1;θ). Since neither self-enforcing constraint binds, a(0) = a∗. Conse-
quently, with µ1 = µ2 = 0, from (??) σr = σs for all such θ , while, (from limC(θ) = R(0),σr = σs and (??),
σs(V1)→ u′2(xRS2 (V1))/u′1(xRS1 (V1)) because θ → θ 0, where xRSi is agent i’s allocation at V1 in the optimal risk-
sharing contract. So far V1 has been held fixed, but we extend the above arguments for a range of values for V1.
For ε > 0 small enough that
¯
V RS1 + ε < V¯
RS
1 − ε , consider [¯V
RS
1 + ε,V¯
RS
1 − ε]. Since
¯
ξ (V1)> 0 and continuous
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on [
¯
V RS1 + ε,V¯
RS
1 − ε], we can define
¯¯
ξ (ε) := minV1∈[
¯
V1+ε,V¯1−ε] ¯
ξ (V1), where
¯¯
ξ (ε)> 0. Thus, for θ such that
ξˆ (θ)<
¯¯
ξ (ε), current actions are efficient (see above) for all V1 ∈ [¯V
RS
1 +ε,V¯
RS
1 −ε], so that σ r = σ s on this in-
terval. Moreover, at
¯
V RS1 +ε , σs(¯
V1 +ε)→ u′2(xRS2 (¯V
RS
1 +ε))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (¯
V RS1 +ε)), and at V¯
RS
1 −ε , σs(V¯ RS1 −ε)→
u′2(x
RS
2 (V¯
RS
1 − ε))/u′1(xRS1 (V¯ RS1 − ε)). Also, for V1 ∈ [¯V
RS
1 + ε,V¯
RS
1 − ε], σs(¯V
RS
1 + ε) ≤ σs(V1) ≤ σs(V¯ RS1 − ε)
by the concavity of the value function. It follows that for any η > 0 and for all θ close enough to θ 0, σr = σs
for any σs ∈ [u′2(xRS2 (¯V
RS
1 + ε))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (¯
V RS1 + ε)) +η ,u
′
2(x
RS
2 (V¯
RS
1 − ε))/u′1(xRS1 (V¯ RS1 − ε))−η ]. Since ε and
η can be made arbitrarily small, and u′2(xRS2 (¯
V RS1 ))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (¯
V RS1 )) =
¯
ρRSs , u′2(xRS2 (V¯
RS
1 ))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (V¯
RS
1 )) = ρ¯
RS
s ,
the claim in part (ii) of the proposition follows.
B. Maintain the assumption that δ >
¯
δ . Define
¯
V1(θ) to be the minimum efficient value for V1 in state s in
the HU problem (i.e., where V ′2(¯
V1(θ)) = 0). Recall that agent 1’s self-enforcing constraint binds at this point,
D1(a2;θ) = ¯
V1(θ) (see Lemma 16). Since θ → θ 0, ¯V1(θ) = D1(a2;θ)→ E[∑τ≥t δ
τ−tu1(Y sτ1 ) | s0] = ¯V1, and
consider the sequence of optimal contracts at
¯
V1(θ), denoted by ¯
C(θ), as θ → θ 0. From the foregoing, lim
¯
C(θ)
(as before, taking a convergent subsequence if necessary) yields agent 1 a payoff of
¯
V1. Let ¯
R denote the optimal
risk-sharing contract at
¯
V1. We assert that lim ¯
C(θ) =
¯
R. If V˜2(lim ¯
C(θ))> V˜2(¯
R), then since lim
¯
C(θ) satisfies
the risk-sharing constraints at
¯
V1 ((S.11c) holds because zs(at
′
) is maximal in the RS case), this contradicts
the optimality of
¯
R. If V˜2(lim ¯
C(θ))< V˜2(¯
R): this implies that we can fix V1 > ¯
V1 close enough to ¯
V1 such that
the RS payoff, say, V RS2 (V1) > V˜2(lim ¯
C(θ))+η , for some η > 0, and from part A, V2(V1;θ) (where we make
the dependence of V2 on θ in the HU problem explicit) is defined for θ close enough to θ 0 and converges
to V RS2 (V1) as θ → θ 0. Thus, for θ close enough to θ 0, |V2(V1;θ)−V RS2 (V1)| < η/2. Since for θ close
enough to θ 0 that V1 > ¯
V1(θ), V˜2(¯
C(θ)) = V2(¯
V1(θ);θ)≥V2(V1;θ) by V2(·;θ) decreasing, then for all θ close
enough to θ 0 we have V˜2(¯
C(θ)) ≥ V2(V1;θ) > V˜2(lim ¯C(θ)) +η/2 = limV˜2(¯C(θ)) +η/2, a contradiction.
Thus, V˜2(lim ¯
C(θ)) = V˜2(¯
R), and so lim
¯
C(θ) =
¯
R, otherwise, there would be two optimal RS contracts at
¯
V1,
which is impossible. Next, at
¯
V1(θ), σs = 0, and lim ¯
C(θ) =
¯
R implies that σr → u′2(xRS2 (¯V1))/u
′
1(x
RS
1 (¯
V1)).
A symmetric argument applies at V¯1(θ) defined as the maximum value for V1 in state s. Given the updating
equation is continuous and nondecreasing, and from part A, the claim of part (i) of the proposition then follows
(for δ >
¯
δ ).
C. Finally, assume δ ≤
¯
δ : So
¯
V RS1 = V¯
RS
1 =: V
AUT
1 say, and there is a unique feasible contract in the RS
case, autarky, which we denote RAUT . As in part B, consider the sequence of optimal contracts at
¯
V1(θ), de-
noted by
¯
C(θ), as θ → θ 0.
¯
V1(θ) = D1(a2;θ)→ E[∑τ≥t δ τ−tu1(Y sτ1 ) | s0] = V AUT1 , and likewise V˜2(¯C(θ))≥
D2(a1;θ)→ E[∑τ≥t δ τ−tu2(Y sτ2 ) | s0] = V˜2(RAUT ). Hence, lim ¯C(θ) (as before, taking a convergent subse-
quence if necessary) yields agent 1 a payoff of V AUT1 and agent 2 a payoff of at least V˜2(R
AUT ). If V˜2(lim ¯
C(θ))>
V˜2(RAUT ), then since lim ¯
C(θ) satisfies the risk-sharing constraints at V AUT1 ((S.11c) holds because z
s(a(τ))
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is maximal in the RS case), this contradicts the optimality of RAUT . Hence, V˜2(lim ¯
C(θ)) = V˜2(RAUT ) and so
lim
¯
C(θ) = RAUT by the uniqueness of the optimal RS contract. Since a symmetric argument applies at V¯1(θ),
both at σs = 0 and σs = ∞, σr→ u′2(xRS2 (V AUT1 ))/u′1(xRS1 (V AUT1 )) =
¯
ρRSs = ρ¯RSs , so part (i) of the proposition
follows.
